Yegiazaryan v. Smagin (22-381)
argument 22-381Yegiazaryan v. Smagin
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 4m
9 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 9 days ago
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What is the central issue the parties are arguing about in Yegiazaryan v. Smagin?
We'll hear argument this morning in Case 22-381,
Yigarzarian v. Smoggin. Mr. Levy? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, in R.J.R. Nabisco, the Court held that private plaintiffs may sue under civil RICO for trouble damages if they suffer a domestic injury. Considering the plain text, the Court's precedents, and the common law, it is clear that a civil RICO plaintiff is injured at its domicile. This makes sense. Congress legislated to address domestic concerns— and to protect U.S. persons, and this bright-line rule ensures that U.S. domicile plaintiffs will have a right to sue under RICO. And as a matter of comedy, it avoids interference with the remedial schemes of foreign states. In response, Mr. Smegen appears to propose a variant on the Ninth Circuit Gestalt test, which considered the conduct of one of the 12 defendants in the suit and the situs of the plaintiff's property.
But RJR already held that The focus of RICO's private right of action is the plaintiff's injury and not the defendant's conduct, and perhaps that is why Smegan here wishes to have the court overrule Arger and Bisco. As far as the focus on the plaintiff's property, the statute, again, focuses on an injury to the person, not the property, and regardless, the common law instructs that the nature of the property here being intangible, it's a judgment and a debt, it follows the person of the plaintiff creditor and that is where it is located. So the injury here was in Russia and not the United States. Following the common law makes sense because it avoids the odd result of allowing a foreign plaintiff to bring a foreign judgment or a war to the United States
to create a domestic injury. Finally, it is clear that the decision below will be unworkable. The Ninth Circuit purported to apply the same test as the Third Circuit, and yet those two circuits split on nearly identical facts in SEFTET and the decision below. And adopting the Ninth Circuit's approach will only generate more splits, considering the scores of conduct and predicates that allow a claim under RICO and the categories of intangible property. This is not what RJR Nabisco intended. The Court should reverse the decision below. I welcome the Court's questions.
Mr. Levy, you seem to, in your brief and in your opening statement, argue that all property, injury involving all property, the injury accrues at the domicile of the party. How would you deal with real property using your approach?
Right. So our first argument, based on the text of the statute, is that the harm is felt at the domicile of the plaintiff. No matter
where the real property is?
That's right. And our second argument—
Isn't that kind of odd?
Well, it's what Congress intended, and it's rooted in the text of the statute. It protects injuries to the person of the plaintiff and allows the person of the plaintiff to sue for threefold as damages if injured. And in the case of Chattanooga Foundry— which was decided soon after the enactment of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, Chattanooga foundry in the early 1900s. Justice Holmes, for the court, wrote that we do not go behind the person of the plaintiff. And that principle is probative not just because it is close in time. Perhaps the words in versus to seem foreign to us today, but it was interpreted at the time.
So do we... have to decide that all property, the injury, accrues at the domicile, as opposed to just, in this case, we're dealing with intangible property?
I think the Court could decide the case on narrow grounds and to say that it could leave open. The question of whether harm to tangible property is a sufficient basis to proceed, but I do think the Court should look to the text of the statute, which directs it to the person of the plaintiff, and And in the event the Court does look at property, of course, we're dealing here with intangible property. A judgment is a debt, as the Court recognized recently in the context of the Bankruptcy Act, just this term. And as the common law instructs, a debt follows the person or the creditor.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central issue the parties are arguing about in Yegiazaryan v. Smagin?
0:00–8:45
2
How do the counsel’s arguments define a “domestic injury” under civil RICO?
8:45–16:39
3
Why does the debate focus on whether the injury is to tangible or intangible property?
16:39–26:05
4
What role do the California judgment and the foreign arbitration award play in the case?
26:05–33:21
5
How do the parties use the First and Second Restatements of Conflict Laws to support their positions?
33:21–40:43
6
What test does each side propose for determining the location of the injury?
40:43–48:31
7
How do the justices’ “comedy” questions affect the analysis of extraterritoriality?
48:31–57:07
8
What are the potential outcomes if the Court affirms or reverses the lower‑court decision?
57:07–1:04:09