Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation (20-543)
argument 20-543Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 44m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the core dispute over the definition of “Indian tribe” in the ISTA and CARES Act?
We will hear argument first this morning in case 2543, Yalen versus the Confederated Tribes and the Consolidated Case. Mr. Garnieri.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, our fundamental submission in this case is that in defining Indian tribe for ISTA purposes, Congress did not deliberately include Alaska Native regional and village corporations, only to then exclude all of them by subjecting them to a formal political recognition requirement that no ANC meets or indeed has ever met. Instead, the settled understanding for the last 45 years has been that ANCs are eligible to be treated as Indian tribes for ISTA purposes, even though ANCs are not and have never been federally recognized Indian tribes. That interpretation has been endorsed by all three branches of the federal government. Congress was acting against the backdrop of those settled understandings when it incorporated the ISTA definition of Indian tribe into the CARES Act in 2020.
Congress chose to make ANCs eligible to receive millions of dollars of coronavirus relief funds to benefit the many Alaska Natives whom they serve. The decision below contravenes that policy judgment and threatens to shut ANCs out of a wide range of important federal programs. No sound principle of textual interpretation justifies such a dramatic departure from the status quo. Reading the ISTA definition to mean that ANCs are included only in the event that they are someday somehow recognized by the United States for government-to-government relations would render their deliberate inclusion in the statute a dead letter. Either the recognition clause must mean something else or it does not apply to ANCs.
Now, we principally urge the latter approach, which the Department of the Interior and the Indian Health Service adopted decades ago, and which the Ninth Circuit endorsed in the Cook Inlet case. In our view, Congress defined the entities eligible to enter into ISTA agreements as federally recognized Indian tribes, and also, in addition, the entities that play a similar role in the special case of Alaska, namely Alaska Native villages and Alaska Native corporations defined in an established pursuant to ANCSA. That reading, unlike Respondent's reading, gives effect to every word and clause in the statute. I welcome the court's questions.
Counsel, as I think you confirmed in this opening statement, you rely heavily on the legislative history, the congressional purpose, the post-enactment history. And there was a time when this court also relied on those sources, but this is not that time. And what is the best case you can cite from recent years for your general approach?
Well, I think the case that we find the most instructive is the court's decision in the United States against Hayes, which is the case discussed in our opening brief. In Hayes, the court was considering a statutory definition of the term domestic misdemeanor violence. Sorry. misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. And the statutory definition there had a prefatory clause and then two subsections. And the question for the court was how to apply a modifier in the second subsection. And based on textual and contextual evidence, the court concluded that the modifier that appeared in the second subclause of that definition actually applied to its antecedent was one of the words in the prefatory clause at the beginning of the definition and we think we're asking the court here for an even less sort of you know the interpretation that we're urging here is even more naturally sort of derived from the text and the interpretation of court adopted in
be treated as Indian tribes.
Thank you, Counsel. Justice Thomas?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Counsel, would you give us again, would you repeat, maybe I missed it, your textual argument again. It seems like the It seems I don't know how you cannot have the phrase or clause at the end modifying the entire list.
Well, Justice Thomas, the textual argument is that if you look at the definition of ISTA should not be read to include ANCs in a – Congress did not deliberately and specifically refer to Alaska Native village and regional corporations established
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core dispute over the definition of “Indian tribe” in the ISTA and CARES Act?
0:00–13:19
2
How do the parties interpret the “recognition” clause – ordinary meaning or term‑of‑art?
13:19–26:52
3
Why does Congress include Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) in the statute, and what was its intent?
26:52–40:36
4
What is the “absurdity” argument and how do the Justices question it?
40:36–53:24
5
How would excluding ANCs affect federal funding and services for Alaska Natives?
53:24–1:05:25
6
What alternative reading of the eligibility clause do the respondents propose?
1:05:25–1:17:35
7
How do the Justices address practical concerns like double‑counting and tribal governance?
1:17:35–1:31:13
8
What are the final arguments and the requested outcome of the case?
1:31:13–1:44:10