Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (12-1226)

argument 12-1226

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the factual background of Peggy Young’s pregnancy‑related lifting restriction claim?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 12-1226, Young v. United Parcel Service. Mr. Bagansas.

Paul D. Clement 0:08

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. If Peggy Young had sought an accommodation for a 20-pound lifting restriction that resulted from any number of conditions, whether acquired on or off the job, the summary judgment record reflects that UPS would have granted that accommodation. But because Peggy Young's 20-pound lifting restriction resulted from her pregnancy and not from one of those conditions, UPS rejected her request. That, we submit, is a violation of the second clause of the PDA, which, if it means anything, must mean that when an employee seeks an accommodation or benefit due to her pregnancy, that she is entitled to the same accommodation that her employer would have given her.

Anthony M. Kennedy 0:45

But you make it sound as if the only reason A condition that was not accommodated was a lifting restriction because of pregnancy, and I did not understand that to be the case. I mean, that's the way you start. You want me to say it's only pregnancy, unless I've missed something.

Paul D. Clement 1:03

Well, so I think on the summary judgment record here, Your Honor, the three very broad classes of limitations that UPS accommodates do, at least there's a genuine issue of material fact that they cover the waterfront of everything but pregnancy. But our position is that those three broad classes by themselves, even if there are some conditions out there that they don't cover, create — Well, I mean, I think

Anthony M. Kennedy 1:25

that's a necessary starting point for your case. It seems to me that you started out by really giving a misimpression.

Paul D. Clement 1:32

Well, Your Honor, I would submit that that's not right. I would submit that on this summary judgment record, UPS acknowledges that they provide accommodations to people with on-the-job injuries, but also the summary judgment record shows that UPS provides accommodations to drivers with off-the-job injuries that result in DOT disqualification. And UPS has not been able to point to a single driver. who has a lifting restriction similar to my client, Peggy Young's, who didn't get accommodated, who was not pregnant. So

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 2:00

I think — What would your case be if, let's accept, for argument's sake, if there's a category, people who are injured off-duty who do not get light work assignments? So you pointed to three large categories that do, but let's suppose one category doesn't.

Paul D. Clement 2:20

Yes. Yes. So in that case, our position would be, as the plain text of the statute demands, that the employer would be required to treat the pregnant plaintiff the same as those classes of employees who get accommodations. Most favored

Kathryn Hackett King 2:34

nation's treatment. So it doesn't have to be read that way. It could be read that way, and it could also mean that if you give it to employees generally, you have to give it to pregnant employees, although there may be special classes that I think one of the briefs had an example about, you know, if you have your senior employees driven to work when they are unable to drive themselves, you have to do the same for pregnant women. Would you say that that's

Paul D. Clement 3:11

the case? No, we would not say that. We would not say that because our position is that the statutory text requires that employers provide workers who are disabled by pregnancy, the same treatment they would receive if they themselves had a similar, had a condition with a similar effect on the ability to work but that had a different source. So what the statute prohibits is discrimination based on the source of the workplace limitation, not based on seniority, not based on position within the company. What if

Stephen G. Breyer 3:39

you have a, suppose, I mean, we have a brief, as you've seen it, from the truck drivers, and they say they don't, give many of these benefits to anybody. And suppose they do, though, give a benefit to a truck driver who has driven over a particularly difficult mountain pass, you know, where he'd gotten himself in some danger. Now, the harm or the disability is lifting precisely the same. It's just that the source was different.