Adam Elga

And I've tried to argue against that.

And along the lines of, hey, if you think there's this special attitude of suspending judgment or my probability is not a probability of 0.3, but it's rather best represented by an interval from 0.2 to 0.7 or something like that.

I'm interested in pressing people who have that attitude on.

Well, what is that attitude like?

say about what you ought to do, if anything.

And I guess I agree with you that it's not so comfortable to just say, well, just be silent about it.

But that said, there is a worry lurking here.

And it's the thing that caused me to be cautious before jumping on to your case of, well, you should just be 50-50 between those two scientific hypotheses.

And that is,

Exactly because, as you said, we have to have some prior degrees of belief in those various hypotheses if we're to end up with some state of mind that could justify our actions.

There has to be some principle that governs those priors.

The reason I was cautious is I was thinking, I want to watch out because in some of those cases, the priors that I think are reasonable are

are highly non-even.

And I'm thinking of cases of theories that are very complicated or ad hoc.

One of the reasons that I was excited about this conversation is I

thought I'd get a chance to ask you this question, which is right in the vicinity of what we were talking about.

And this is in some ways following on some stuff you said in your fine tuning podcast episode.

So philosophers are really find it easy to fall into representing scientific reasoning as Bayesian reasoning.

So we either represent or reconstruct scientific theory choice as

starting with some priors over the theories, maybe not even ended.