Adam Elga

And maybe you're confident that you wake up at 3 a.m.

and at 4 a.m.

most nights, but you forget each waking.

It just seems like it should be 50-50.

What do you have that tells between those two hypotheses?

It's not even, as one of my colleagues emphasized to me, it's not even as though they're like two different stories of the world that could, for example, differ in how simple they are so that that could favor or tilt the deck.

No, it's just where am I within this one story?

And I do confess an inclination to think

Split it 50-50.

Just as a matter of terminology—

The way the terms are used, no, because the self-locating uncertainty is supposed to be the sort of uncertainty as between scenarios within a world.

But your more general point, the content of your point is, look, doesn't the same kind of intuition push us towards a more general way of treating uncertainty?

possibilities even-handedly, even if the possibilities involve different worlds.

And that principle has some adherence.

It's the famous principle of, famous or infamous principle of indifference.

And there's a whole battle, a separate battle, I think, to be waged about whether that kind of principle is true.

That principle is generally thought to be stronger and a bit more tendentious than the principle that just is like the

analog of that, but only applies as between self-locating hypotheses that are in the same world.

Just as a footnote, this idea of, I don't want to have a particular probability about something.

I'm really interested in that.