Adam Tooze

Technology is key here, and that's been the driver all along. The basic story, and this is why this is all so kind of ironic and weird, is that we've gotten really, really good at manufacturing an industry in the same way as we got really, really good at farming. Once upon a time, the vast majority of Americans were farmers, and that wasn't a lifestyle choice.

Technology is key here, and that's been the driver all along. The basic story, and this is why this is all so kind of ironic and weird, is that we've gotten really, really good at manufacturing an industry in the same way as we got really, really good at farming. Once upon a time, the vast majority of Americans were farmers, and that wasn't a lifestyle choice.

That was because we just couldn't feed ourselves because we were so bad at farming. We got very good at farming.

That was because we just couldn't feed ourselves because we were so bad at farming. We got very good at farming.

Yeah. I mean, that's the norm, right? Because people are desperate and all over the world and always been desperate. And so it's really anomalous to have rich farmers. That's a really peculiar situation to be in. Right.

Yeah. I mean, that's the norm, right? Because people are desperate and all over the world and always been desperate. And so it's really anomalous to have rich farmers. That's a really peculiar situation to be in. Right.

Yeah, for sure. You get slave labor, you get various types of forced labor. Right. But the story here of technological change is one that just cuts through this. The crisis story, the New Deal that you might be invoking, for instance, in the 30s, it doesn't change anything about the balance between the bits, right?

Yeah, for sure. You get slave labor, you get various types of forced labor. Right. But the story here of technological change is one that just cuts through this. The crisis story, the New Deal that you might be invoking, for instance, in the 30s, it doesn't change anything about the balance between the bits, right?

So the share of industry in the US economy as a whole was 40% before the New Deal and after the New Deal and continued at that level until the late 60s when really rapid technological change and the global redivision of labor kicked in where the Japanese learned to make cars, which Americans would buy. And there was that shift.

So the share of industry in the US economy as a whole was 40% before the New Deal and after the New Deal and continued at that level until the late 60s when really rapid technological change and the global redivision of labor kicked in where the Japanese learned to make cars, which Americans would buy. And there was that shift.

So I think what history does and what policy does is set the terms under which capital and labor, amongst other players, transact within the frame, if you like, that technology provides. And New Deal was very favorable to organized labor, which is why I think middle class America looks back to it with nostalgia. That was the Treaty of Detroit. And neoliberalism broke that.

So I think what history does and what policy does is set the terms under which capital and labor, amongst other players, transact within the frame, if you like, that technology provides. And New Deal was very favorable to organized labor, which is why I think middle class America looks back to it with nostalgia. That was the Treaty of Detroit. And neoliberalism broke that.

And it's in a sense now as though they want the promise of the middle class lifestyle of the 50s without the power relations, which would be powerful, organized labor that actually made that possible. Wow. Okay. And all of this suggesting somehow and feeding off the idea that America's got to make things. And if it doesn't make things, it's somehow just floating free and without substance.

And it's in a sense now as though they want the promise of the middle class lifestyle of the 50s without the power relations, which would be powerful, organized labor that actually made that possible. Wow. Okay. And all of this suggesting somehow and feeding off the idea that America's got to make things. And if it doesn't make things, it's somehow just floating free and without substance.

I think that's right. And I don't disagree with Zorab in his analysis of the 18th and 19th century. My question is really about the relevance of that analysis to the 21st century and the world that we're currently in.

I think that's right. And I don't disagree with Zorab in his analysis of the 18th and 19th century. My question is really about the relevance of that analysis to the 21st century and the world that we're currently in.

And the question really is, sure, we know from many cases, not just the American one, that you can engineer on the upswing, if you like, an increase in the share of your manufacturing industrial sector. Most recently, the Chinese have done it to truly spectacular effect. The question is whether a mature and rich society like the American one can or even should want to do that.

And the question really is, sure, we know from many cases, not just the American one, that you can engineer on the upswing, if you like, an increase in the share of your manufacturing industrial sector. Most recently, the Chinese have done it to truly spectacular effect. The question is whether a mature and rich society like the American one can or even should want to do that.

Now, this doesn't mean that America can't cherry pick individual sectors and say, we'd really like to have more competence in chips. Fine. Absolutely. You can do that. You can go after that.

Now, this doesn't mean that America can't cherry pick individual sectors and say, we'd really like to have more competence in chips. Fine. Absolutely. You can do that. You can go after that.