Alice Han
👤 SpeakerAppearances Over Time
Podcast Appearances
So we have really heterogeneous outcomes coming out of the U.S., which again is deeply, deeply confusing, not just for us, but for the Chinese as well.
So we have really heterogeneous outcomes coming out of the U.S., which again is deeply, deeply confusing, not just for us, but for the Chinese as well.
So we have really heterogeneous outcomes coming out of the U.S., which again is deeply, deeply confusing, not just for us, but for the Chinese as well.
I mean, I completely agree. I think Latin America was always going to be under Lula in China's camp. It's not a surprise that Lula is now in Beijing signing a trillion dollars of deals in Chinese investment in Brazil and purchases of Brazilian agricultural products as China again tries to diversify away from the U.S. towards Latin America.
I mean, I completely agree. I think Latin America was always going to be under Lula in China's camp. It's not a surprise that Lula is now in Beijing signing a trillion dollars of deals in Chinese investment in Brazil and purchases of Brazilian agricultural products as China again tries to diversify away from the U.S. towards Latin America.
I mean, I completely agree. I think Latin America was always going to be under Lula in China's camp. It's not a surprise that Lula is now in Beijing signing a trillion dollars of deals in Chinese investment in Brazil and purchases of Brazilian agricultural products as China again tries to diversify away from the U.S. towards Latin America.
But I think the real winner is going to be the ability to launch a successful trauma offensive with Europe. I think Europe was very sickened by Trump's treatment of Zelensky in the Oval Office and its behavior towards Europe, not just Trump, but Vance, their behavior towards Europe since then. And I think Europe, as is its historical want, is going back to strategic autonomy.
But I think the real winner is going to be the ability to launch a successful trauma offensive with Europe. I think Europe was very sickened by Trump's treatment of Zelensky in the Oval Office and its behavior towards Europe, not just Trump, but Vance, their behavior towards Europe since then. And I think Europe, as is its historical want, is going back to strategic autonomy.
But I think the real winner is going to be the ability to launch a successful trauma offensive with Europe. I think Europe was very sickened by Trump's treatment of Zelensky in the Oval Office and its behavior towards Europe, not just Trump, but Vance, their behavior towards Europe since then. And I think Europe, as is its historical want, is going back to strategic autonomy.
It's trying to hedge between these two superpowers, China and the U.S., And I think in this current climate, it is probably veering more towards China on trade because it sees China as the adult in the room. And I think what's going to be interesting, Scott, at the end of June is two really important meetings.
It's trying to hedge between these two superpowers, China and the U.S., And I think in this current climate, it is probably veering more towards China on trade because it sees China as the adult in the room. And I think what's going to be interesting, Scott, at the end of June is two really important meetings.
It's trying to hedge between these two superpowers, China and the U.S., And I think in this current climate, it is probably veering more towards China on trade because it sees China as the adult in the room. And I think what's going to be interesting, Scott, at the end of June is two really important meetings.
We're going to have NATO at the end of June and then the China-EU summit at the end of June now in Beijing, not in Brussels, because they ultimately wanted to show respect to Xi Jinping, who originally couldn't make it. So I think this is going to be a real stress test for transatlantic relations.
We're going to have NATO at the end of June and then the China-EU summit at the end of June now in Beijing, not in Brussels, because they ultimately wanted to show respect to Xi Jinping, who originally couldn't make it. So I think this is going to be a real stress test for transatlantic relations.
We're going to have NATO at the end of June and then the China-EU summit at the end of June now in Beijing, not in Brussels, because they ultimately wanted to show respect to Xi Jinping, who originally couldn't make it. So I think this is going to be a real stress test for transatlantic relations.
And it could mean that we see further reduction in trade and non-tariff barriers between the EU and China come end of June, which is something that Trump won't be very happy about. He's already saying that the EU could be nastier than China. So I think that the EU is next in the firing line, so to speak.
And it could mean that we see further reduction in trade and non-tariff barriers between the EU and China come end of June, which is something that Trump won't be very happy about. He's already saying that the EU could be nastier than China. So I think that the EU is next in the firing line, so to speak.
And it could mean that we see further reduction in trade and non-tariff barriers between the EU and China come end of June, which is something that Trump won't be very happy about. He's already saying that the EU could be nastier than China. So I think that the EU is next in the firing line, so to speak.
I would say, Scott, the state of the economy is a story of two really divergent Chinese pathways. Number one is what I would call a structural macro slowdown, and that is driven, as you mentioned, Scott, by these challenges, the real estate sector being one of them, but also the fact that Private consumption remains remarkably weak, only 40% of GDP compared to 70% or more in the US.
I would say, Scott, the state of the economy is a story of two really divergent Chinese pathways. Number one is what I would call a structural macro slowdown, and that is driven, as you mentioned, Scott, by these challenges, the real estate sector being one of them, but also the fact that Private consumption remains remarkably weak, only 40% of GDP compared to 70% or more in the US.