Alice Han

Because they definitely have dedicated teams that specialize in this.

Yeah, I love the way that you described, James, Trump's foreign policy of serving deals and not ideals.

I think that's a great way to view it.

The administration gives a good diagnosis to the Chinese economy, saying that they wanted to encourage other countries to adopt trade policies that, quote unquote, rebalance China's economy towards household consumption.

It's certainly something that

you know, we've been waiting for the Chinese economy to do.

But I think, again, if we read between the lines, it's clear even in the economic section of the relationship, yes, it is milder than the previous documents, but it's clear that they reserve the right and give themselves the policy space to

to keep using tariffs or non-tariff barriers, or even pressure other trading partners, I'm thinking about Europe in particular, to put tariffs on China and enforce tougher rules of origin.

I think this will be particularly germane to say a Mexico or a Vietnam, where China does a lot of rerouting of trade.

Certainly I could foresee in 2026,

that Besson and Greer, if the relationship doesn't pan out well, decides to opt for, I think, more protectionist strategy, enforcing rules of origin through these other third-party countries.

It's not my base case, but definitely I think this document gives them the policy space to use that tool or lever to apply more pressure on China.

So I don't think it's all rosy, but certainly it is at a rhetorical level quite a bit of an improvement to previous NSS documents.

But James, are we missing anything?

Is there a danger to Trump administration's seemingly more dovish position on China?

Certainly, when we speak to some of the national security experts, they're very worried about China's cybersecurity risk.

James, what's your take on this?

Very interesting, James.

We are going to talk more about a seemingly dovish turn on policy related to chips with Chris Miller after the break.

Well, welcome back.