Ambassador John Negroponte
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Das war also der Anfang des Errichtens eines groĂen Nordvietnames, der im SĂŒden war. Am Ende des Krieges, 1975, gab es etwa 14 Divisionen. von Nord-Vietnamiens Truppen in SĂŒd-Vietnamiens. Also, was als Guerilla-Wahl beginnt, endet wirklich als konventionelles militĂ€risches Verletzen von Saigon durch die Nord-Vietnamiens-Armee.
Also, diese Dinge darĂŒber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war wĂ€hrend einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.
Also, diese Dinge darĂŒber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war wĂ€hrend einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.
Also, diese Dinge darĂŒber, dass es eine Guerilla-Wahl war, ja, es war wĂ€hrend einer bestimmten Phase, aber im Grunde genommen waren die Nord-Vietnamiens bereit, das, was sie hatten, in es zu werfen, Achieve their ultimate objective, which was the reunification of the country.
No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.
No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.
No, it was seen as part of the Cold War. It was a regional conflict in a Cold War context. And just like in Korea, where there had been a dividing line between North and South Korea, and we came to South Korea's defense, I think we saw it as a way of dealing with a form of North Vietnamese aggression.
It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, fĂŒr die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.
It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, fĂŒr die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.
It got all bollocked up in the kind of politics and psychology that the two of you were discussing earlier. Aber ich meine, ich denke, wir sahen es als eine ziemlich straightforward Situation. Die Leute, fĂŒr die ich gearbeitet habe, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ellsworth Bunker, William Westmoreland, der General, der Kommandanten-General, sie waren in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren wach.
They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.
They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.
They saw this as sort of like a Munich, like a Hitlerian, you know, they're responding to... No appeasement.
Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.
Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.
Everybody is always fighting the last war. I mean, that's the way wars go. I think you guys overplay in your discussion... the lasting impact of Vietnam. Because I think we finally got, we had what we called the Vietnam Syndrome. And for a number of years after that, and I went on to many different jobs. In fact, I was Henry Kissinger's director for Vietnam when he negotiated the peace agreement.
And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamå zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.
And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamå zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.
And I was with Bush and Reagan and Bush later on. We sort of finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome. I would say when Bush decided to, you know, Panamå zu zerstören und Noriega zu ersetzen, Noriega zu ersetzen. Und dann ging er in die erste Irakische Krieg, die Kuwaitische Krieg.
Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms ĂŒbernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.