Ambassador John Negroponte

Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms übernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.

Und an diesem Punkt, glaube ich, haben wir endlich zumindest den Aspekt des Vietnames-Syndroms übernommen, der sagte, sende nicht die US-Mitglieder.

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

Ich hatte viel damit zu tun. Ich war in der UN, als wir Resolutionen verabschiedeten. Do you accept that premise? I think partially. But I want to identify another trend for you, which I don't know whether you've considered. What is it about these conflicts that we get into them?

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

And then after having trained a whole generation of people to fight the war, to learn the reason why, to be committed to the policy, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now potentially Ukraine.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I know. But what is it about this propensity that we have to get into these conflicts, but not be able to think it far enough through to assure our own selves that we're really going to stay the course? What kind of friend are you or an ally or a supporter of somebody if halfway through the deal, You decide to pull the plug.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

I'm not denying the social consequences that Vietnam had on people here in this country. But, you know, in terms of what we did to them, by the time the peace talks were over in 1972 and early 73, our exposure in Vietnam was very limited. We had 50,000 troops, not 500,000. And they were relegated entirely to support functions.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

But yeah, but I mean, that's the truth in Vietnam back in 73. And yet, I mean, I was Kissinger's man on Vietnam at that time, you know. They just didn't want to go into the second administration. They didn't want to go into the second administration, the second term, as Henry used to say, reading battlefield reports for breakfast every morning. They just didn't want it. I mean, Nixon was tired.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.

I heard him say it to Joe and Lai. We went out to see Joe and Lai in June and Mao Zedong with Brezhnev a month earlier. And it was exactly that. Henry said, we don't want to be leading battlefield reports.