Andrew Marantz

And so... If abundance liberalism is what succeeds neoliberalism, that's an answer. If Trumpist competitive authoritarianism is what succeeds it, that is an answer. And in a way, this is like a little sort of weird to think about, but it may be the case that it's already happened and we just don't know it yet. This is kind of the Schrodinger's cat thing.

And so... If abundance liberalism is what succeeds neoliberalism, that's an answer. If Trumpist competitive authoritarianism is what succeeds it, that is an answer. And in a way, this is like a little sort of weird to think about, but it may be the case that it's already happened and we just don't know it yet. This is kind of the Schrodinger's cat thing.

I mean, when the rise and fall of the New Deal order came out, The book's introduction said, the New Deal order is over, but we don't yet know what will replace it. That book came out in 1989. So we might be sitting here in a timeline where Trumpism has replaced neoliberalism in 2016, and we just don't know it.

I mean, when the rise and fall of the New Deal order came out, The book's introduction said, the New Deal order is over, but we don't yet know what will replace it. That book came out in 1989. So we might be sitting here in a timeline where Trumpism has replaced neoliberalism in 2016, and we just don't know it.

Yeah, I don't disagree that there are fissures and tensions within the Republican coalition. I mean, one thing about the BAP and Yarvin and all this stuff, the cadres are interested in reading them, but the, you know, chief ideologists in the White House are retweeting them.

Yeah, I don't disagree that there are fissures and tensions within the Republican coalition. I mean, one thing about the BAP and Yarvin and all this stuff, the cadres are interested in reading them, but the, you know, chief ideologists in the White House are retweeting them.

And not only is the vice president reading them, but he's saying things like, when the Supreme Court gives us an order we don't like, we should say, the justice has made his order, now let him enforce it, right? So I think you could put together some worrisome signs. I also think the strength or weakness of the opposition matters enormously in this too.

And not only is the vice president reading them, but he's saying things like, when the Supreme Court gives us an order we don't like, we should say, the justice has made his order, now let him enforce it, right? So I think you could put together some worrisome signs. I also think the strength or weakness of the opposition matters enormously in this too.

So in every place in India, in Hungary, in Israel, the reactionary right is able to rampage to victory precisely because of the weakness and division within the opposition. So none of this, I agree, is foretold. One of the things I worry about is it kind of overly rigid reliance on the kind of playbook stuff, like this isn't how it's supposed to be done.

So in every place in India, in Hungary, in Israel, the reactionary right is able to rampage to victory precisely because of the weakness and division within the opposition. So none of this, I agree, is foretold. One of the things I worry about is it kind of overly rigid reliance on the kind of playbook stuff, like this isn't how it's supposed to be done.

Because I agree, he's doing different things than what Orban is doing. He's doing some Bukele stuff. He's doing some improvisation. I just woke up today and thought of something weird and put it on Truth Social. It's a hodgepodge of stuff.

Because I agree, he's doing different things than what Orban is doing. He's doing some Bukele stuff. He's doing some improvisation. I just woke up today and thought of something weird and put it on Truth Social. It's a hodgepodge of stuff.

I mean, Kim Lane Shepela has this term, the Frankenstate, where you can kind of Frankenstein a bunch of legitimate seeming things and make your own new form of an illegitimate state. Now, I don't think anyone would disagree that Trump is not as patient and diligent and well-read as Victor Orban. But, you know, Bolsonaro did a version of this in Brazil.

I mean, Kim Lane Shepela has this term, the Frankenstate, where you can kind of Frankenstein a bunch of legitimate seeming things and make your own new form of an illegitimate state. Now, I don't think anyone would disagree that Trump is not as patient and diligent and well-read as Victor Orban. But, you know, Bolsonaro did a version of this in Brazil.

And yes, he ended up getting defeated in the next election, but he came very close to rigging it in his own favor. And Bolsonaro was not a disciplined, well-read guy either. So there's different playbooks and you can invent new ones as you go. Let me turn this question around, Zach.

And yes, he ended up getting defeated in the next election, but he came very close to rigging it in his own favor. And Bolsonaro was not a disciplined, well-read guy either. So there's different playbooks and you can invent new ones as you go. Let me turn this question around, Zach.

Well, you could make a version of the fighting the last war argument in precisely this context, that the Democrats are learning that maybe they should have waited Trump out more the first time and not done such a big, visibly cringe resistance. And so now they're trying to play dead more than they should.

Well, you could make a version of the fighting the last war argument in precisely this context, that the Democrats are learning that maybe they should have waited Trump out more the first time and not done such a big, visibly cringe resistance. And so now they're trying to play dead more than they should.

Yeah, this is where, again, I would sort of argue for a wider frame. So, like... I think that the timeline can be broad enough that it can contain something like Trump losing some or all of the tech right without him being done for. You know, for example. I'm not saying he's done for. No, no, no. But I mean, even if we're just thinking about where this ends up. Yeah.

Yeah, this is where, again, I would sort of argue for a wider frame. So, like... I think that the timeline can be broad enough that it can contain something like Trump losing some or all of the tech right without him being done for. You know, for example. I'm not saying he's done for. No, no, no. But I mean, even if we're just thinking about where this ends up. Yeah.