Annie Jacobsen

Because you want to have differing opinions. But as things become more viperous, both here in the United States and in nuclear-armed nations… All bets are off at whether your advisors are going to give you good advice.

Well, again, we're talking about that six-minute window. So it's not exactly like you can, let me put a pot of coffee on and really tell me what you think. And we can strategize here, right? You have your SECDEF and your chairman, maybe the vice chairman.

Well, again, we're talking about that six-minute window. So it's not exactly like you can, let me put a pot of coffee on and really tell me what you think. And we can strategize here, right? You have your SECDEF and your chairman, maybe the vice chairman.

Well, again, we're talking about that six-minute window. So it's not exactly like you can, let me put a pot of coffee on and really tell me what you think. And we can strategize here, right? You have your SECDEF and your chairman, maybe the vice chairman.

And, okay, we haven't even begun to talk about the fact that at the same time, these advisors also have a parallel concern, and that's called continuity of government. Okay? So while they're trying to advise on the nuclear counterstrike in response to the incoming nuclear missile, they have to be thinking, how are we going to keep the government functioning when...

And, okay, we haven't even begun to talk about the fact that at the same time, these advisors also have a parallel concern, and that's called continuity of government. Okay? So while they're trying to advise on the nuclear counterstrike in response to the incoming nuclear missile, they have to be thinking, how are we going to keep the government functioning when...

And, okay, we haven't even begun to talk about the fact that at the same time, these advisors also have a parallel concern, and that's called continuity of government. Okay? So while they're trying to advise on the nuclear counterstrike in response to the incoming nuclear missile, they have to be thinking, how are we going to keep the government functioning when...

The missiles start hitting when the bombs start going off. And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let's say, getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book. So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. The Secretary of Defense is a human. And imagine that job while trying to advise the president.

The missiles start hitting when the bombs start going off. And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let's say, getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book. So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. The Secretary of Defense is a human. And imagine that job while trying to advise the president.

The missiles start hitting when the bombs start going off. And that is about getting yourself out of the Pentagon, let's say, getting yourself to one of these nuclear bunkers that I write about at length in the book. So how much can you ask of a human, right? Because it comes down to a human. The Secretary of Defense is a human. And imagine that job while trying to advise the president.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

And again, you're the president who's not really been paying attention to this because he has many other things to deal with. Speed is not conducive to wisdom.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

That is a term in sort of the national security, nuclear command and control, historical documentation that many of the people that you might call the more dovish type people are, you know, worried about. That the more hawkish people are going to, the military advisors, right, are going to be jamming the president to make these decisions about which targets. Not if.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Well, you've raised a really important question that we look to the historical record for that answer, right? Because astonishingly, all of this began – like when Russia first got the bomb in 1949 – The powers that be, and I write about them in the book in a setup to the first, you know, for the moment of launch, right? Like, it's called how we got here, right?