Arthur Kroeber

side,

Also, to some extent in China as well, a lot of the things in the U.S.

political context that are blamed on the rise of China, we have this problem or that problem because of China, they are predominantly exercises in scapegoating, right?

So we're talking at the beginning of the conversation about the change in the industrial sector, hollowing out of U.S.

manufacturing employment and so forth.

If you look at the trend of U.S.

manufacturing employment as a share of total employment is a straight line from 1946 to today that looks like this.

You cannot find the Cold War.

You cannot find the rise of Japan.

You cannot find NAFTA.

You cannot find China.

You cannot find anything.

What you find basically, I think, is the march of technological progress.

That's basically what that – and so all of these stories about China did this or China did that, yeah, there was some impact.

But mainly what the United States failed to do as the world was transforming in the late 90s, early 2000s, we failed to take seriously our responsibility to –

change our systems of redistribution, of helping people out, of social... We failed in the social contract domestically.

So there were failures of domestic policy, which got then blamed on China, right?

And I think similarly, if you look at scare stories about how China's going to take over the world...

Okay, BYD, very good company.

Huawei, very good company.