Benham Ben-Taliblu

By growing the nuclear program and diminishing the monitoring, they can again induce panic. And so long as they retain the ability to do that, They will always be in control of the monitoring and verification process. And this is despite them being signatories of the NPT. This is despite code 3.1. This is despite the comprehensive safeguards agreement. And this is despite the additional protocol.

By growing the nuclear program and diminishing the monitoring, they can again induce panic. And so long as they retain the ability to do that, They will always be in control of the monitoring and verification process. And this is despite them being signatories of the NPT. This is despite code 3.1. This is despite the comprehensive safeguards agreement. And this is despite the additional protocol.

You know, monitoring and verification is important, but I'm not going to lie, it's technical and it's boring and it's difficult. And it is not as sexy as talking about a potential strike or a potential deal. But deal or no deal, strike or no strike, the way to make sure there is no Iranian nuclear program that has this weapon dimension is 100% transparency, monitoring, and verification.

You know, monitoring and verification is important, but I'm not going to lie, it's technical and it's boring and it's difficult. And it is not as sexy as talking about a potential strike or a potential deal. But deal or no deal, strike or no strike, the way to make sure there is no Iranian nuclear program that has this weapon dimension is 100% transparency, monitoring, and verification.

You know, monitoring and verification is important, but I'm not going to lie, it's technical and it's boring and it's difficult. And it is not as sexy as talking about a potential strike or a potential deal. But deal or no deal, strike or no strike, the way to make sure there is no Iranian nuclear program that has this weapon dimension is 100% transparency, monitoring, and verification.

You need the IEA to be able to come to a broader conclusion with respect to Iran's nuclear program. They haven't been able to do that still. They still have outstanding questions about certain facilities, about not being able to interview previous Iranian nuclear scientists. So long as you have that, you do not have that cloud of suspicion taken away from the Iranian nuclear program.

You need the IEA to be able to come to a broader conclusion with respect to Iran's nuclear program. They haven't been able to do that still. They still have outstanding questions about certain facilities, about not being able to interview previous Iranian nuclear scientists. So long as you have that, you do not have that cloud of suspicion taken away from the Iranian nuclear program.

You need the IEA to be able to come to a broader conclusion with respect to Iran's nuclear program. They haven't been able to do that still. They still have outstanding questions about certain facilities, about not being able to interview previous Iranian nuclear scientists. So long as you have that, you do not have that cloud of suspicion taken away from the Iranian nuclear program.

And that's why I think it behooves us to treat this not just as a technical problem, But as a larger political problem, the nuclear threat and this nuclear monitoring verification challenge is just one more challenge we face from this regime, which since 1979 has been saying death to America and remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. This is just the next layer.

And that's why I think it behooves us to treat this not just as a technical problem, But as a larger political problem, the nuclear threat and this nuclear monitoring verification challenge is just one more challenge we face from this regime, which since 1979 has been saying death to America and remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. This is just the next layer.

And that's why I think it behooves us to treat this not just as a technical problem, But as a larger political problem, the nuclear threat and this nuclear monitoring verification challenge is just one more challenge we face from this regime, which since 1979 has been saying death to America and remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. This is just the next layer.

This is just the regime taking the threats and turning it up to 11.

This is just the regime taking the threats and turning it up to 11.

This is just the regime taking the threats and turning it up to 11.

I think the most important factor there is not us and not the Israelis and not the Iranians, but the Europeans. If in less than six months time, you don't have the Europeans triggering this tool that expires on October 18th, 2025, which is snapback, if you don't have that, then it's likely you have one of two scenarios, either a limited strike or a limited deal in place.

I think the most important factor there is not us and not the Israelis and not the Iranians, but the Europeans. If in less than six months time, you don't have the Europeans triggering this tool that expires on October 18th, 2025, which is snapback, if you don't have that, then it's likely you have one of two scenarios, either a limited strike or a limited deal in place.

I think the most important factor there is not us and not the Israelis and not the Iranians, but the Europeans. If in less than six months time, you don't have the Europeans triggering this tool that expires on October 18th, 2025, which is snapback, if you don't have that, then it's likely you have one of two scenarios, either a limited strike or a limited deal in place.

I can't guess which one is more 51-49 at this moment, but I would say both the Iranians and the Americans have an interest in kind of delaying because they don't like their exit options for political reasons. I certainly think our exit options, you know, ramping up pressure is much more attractive than the regime's exit option, which is having to go full speed for a nuclear weapon.

I can't guess which one is more 51-49 at this moment, but I would say both the Iranians and the Americans have an interest in kind of delaying because they don't like their exit options for political reasons. I certainly think our exit options, you know, ramping up pressure is much more attractive than the regime's exit option, which is having to go full speed for a nuclear weapon.

I can't guess which one is more 51-49 at this moment, but I would say both the Iranians and the Americans have an interest in kind of delaying because they don't like their exit options for political reasons. I certainly think our exit options, you know, ramping up pressure is much more attractive than the regime's exit option, which is having to go full speed for a nuclear weapon.