Benoit Faucon

It relies on supporters as echo chambers, starting on servers rented by the supporters of the group.

And then from there, they disseminate on social media and a very large number of platforms, very often for a relatively short period of time.

After a few hours, it's taken down.

And that attract the attention of would-be recruits.

And from there, they will find a way to contact ISIS members or more experienced ISIS supervisors.

Sometimes it's access to tutorials.

And from that point on, the tools to carry an attack basically are in the hands of these perpetrators.

There's a lot of content that really detail how to carry such attacks.

And all of that would be accessible through basically remote access.

You don't need face-to-face contact with anybody.

In this case, we have a flag found in a car belonging to one of the perpetrators in Australia.

That was an Islamic State flag.

In Manchester a few months ago, a similar attack, this time on a synagogue.

Again, it was proved that it was an Islamic State-inspired attack because the perpetrator called the emergency services and claimed the attack as an Islamic State attack.

Another example in the US, in New Orleans on New Year's Day, the perpetrator posting a video just before the attack and basically saying he was doing it on behalf of the Islamic State.

None of these people had ever traveled, that we know, to specific Islamic State camps.

We don't have that final conclusion for the Sydney perpetrators.

We know they went to the Philippines.

But as far as we know, in all these cases, there was never any evidence of a direct, you know, physical connection to the group.

So if we think about the Paris attacks that killed 130 people in 2015, these perpetrators had been sort of in Syria, fought with ISIS and prepared the attacks in ISIS-controlled territory before coming back to France.