Benquo

Two men meet at a courthouse.

One is there to prosecute his own father for the death of a slave.

The other is there to be indicted for indecency.

The prosecutor, Euthyphro, is certain he understands what decency requires.

The accused, Socrates, is not certain of anything and says so.

His own family thinks it is indecent for a son to prosecute his father.

Euthyphro insists that true decency demands it, that he understands what the gods require better than his relatives do.

Socrates, who is about to be tried for indecency toward the gods, asks Euthyphro to explain what decency actually is, since Euthyphro claims to know, and Socrates will need such knowledge for his own defense.

Euthyphro's first answer is.

Decency is what I am doing right now, prosecuting wrongdoers regardless of kinship.

Socrates points out that this is an example, not a definition.

Euthyphro tries again.

Decency is what the gods love.

But the gods disagree among themselves, Socrates observes, so by this definition the same act could be both decent and indecent.

Euthyphro refines.

Decency is what all the gods love.

And here Socrates asks a question Euthyphro cannot answer.

Do the gods love decent things because they are decent, or are things decent because the gods love them?

If decent things are decent because the gods love them, then decency is arbitrary, a matter of divine whim.

Socrates is too polite to press this to its conclusion for Euthyphro's case, but the implication is hard to miss.