Bill Ackman

And by the way, that loss catalyzed other, what I call mark-to-market losses. So very high profile, huge number, disastrous press. Then people said, okay, Bill's going to go out of business. So we're going to bet against everything he's doing. And we know his entire portfolio because we only own 10 things. And we were short a company called Herbalife, very famously.

We've only really shorted two companies. The first one, there's a book. The second one, there's a movie. We're no longer short companies. So people pushed up the price of Herbalife, which is when you're a short seller, that's catastrophic. I can explain that. And then they also shorted the other stocks that we owned.

We've only really shorted two companies. The first one, there's a book. The second one, there's a movie. We're no longer short companies. So people pushed up the price of Herbalife, which is when you're a short seller, that's catastrophic. I can explain that. And then they also shorted the other stocks that we owned.

We've only really shorted two companies. The first one, there's a book. The second one, there's a movie. We're no longer short companies. So people pushed up the price of Herbalife, which is when you're a short seller, that's catastrophic. I can explain that. And then they also shorted the other stocks that we owned.

And so that Valiant loss led to an overall more than 30% loss in the value of our portfolio. The Valiant loss was real and was crystallized. We ended up selling the position, taking that loss. Most of the other losses were what I would call mark-to-market losses. They were temporary.

And so that Valiant loss led to an overall more than 30% loss in the value of our portfolio. The Valiant loss was real and was crystallized. We ended up selling the position, taking that loss. Most of the other losses were what I would call mark-to-market losses. They were temporary.

And so that Valiant loss led to an overall more than 30% loss in the value of our portfolio. The Valiant loss was real and was crystallized. We ended up selling the position, taking that loss. Most of the other losses were what I would call mark-to-market losses. They were temporary.

But many people go out of business because, as I mentioned before, large move in a price, if investors are redeeming or you have leverage, it can put you out of business. And people assumed if we got put out of business, we'd have to sell everything or cover our short position. And that would make the losses even worse. So Wall Street is kind of ruthless.

But many people go out of business because, as I mentioned before, large move in a price, if investors are redeeming or you have leverage, it can put you out of business. And people assumed if we got put out of business, we'd have to sell everything or cover our short position. And that would make the losses even worse. So Wall Street is kind of ruthless.

But many people go out of business because, as I mentioned before, large move in a price, if investors are redeeming or you have leverage, it can put you out of business. And people assumed if we got put out of business, we'd have to sell everything or cover our short position. And that would make the losses even worse. So Wall Street is kind of ruthless.

So they can make money off of that whole thing.

So they can make money off of that whole thing.

So they can make money off of that whole thing.

What was it like going through that? It was pretty grim. It's actually much worse than that because I had a lot of stuff going on personally as well. And these things tend to be correlated. The valiant mistake came at a time where I was contemplating my marriage. And I was also, you know, the problem with the hedge fund business

What was it like going through that? It was pretty grim. It's actually much worse than that because I had a lot of stuff going on personally as well. And these things tend to be correlated. The valiant mistake came at a time where I was contemplating my marriage. And I was also, you know, the problem with the hedge fund business

What was it like going through that? It was pretty grim. It's actually much worse than that because I had a lot of stuff going on personally as well. And these things tend to be correlated. The valiant mistake came at a time where I was contemplating my marriage. And I was also, you know, the problem with the hedge fund business

is when you get to a certain scale, the CEO becomes like the chief marketing officer of the business. And I'm really an investor as opposed to a marketing guy. But when you have investors who give you a few hundred million dollars, they want to see you, you know, once a year, Bill, I'd love to see you for an hour.

is when you get to a certain scale, the CEO becomes like the chief marketing officer of the business. And I'm really an investor as opposed to a marketing guy. But when you have investors who give you a few hundred million dollars, they want to see you, you know, once a year, Bill, I'd love to see you for an hour.

is when you get to a certain scale, the CEO becomes like the chief marketing officer of the business. And I'm really an investor as opposed to a marketing guy. But when you have investors who give you a few hundred million dollars, they want to see you, you know, once a year, Bill, I'd love to see you for an hour.

But if you've got a couple hundred of those, you find yourself on a plane to the Middle East, to Asia, flying around the country. This is pre-Zoom. And that takes you away from the investment process. You have to delegate more. That was a contributor to the Valiant mistake. So now we lose a ton of money on Valiant. My ex-wife and I were talking about separating, getting divorced.