Bret Weinstein

In other words, your coordination in the planting of crops, the protecting of those crops, and the harvesting of those crops is dependent on whether or not people like and trust each other. And to the extent that they're backstabbing each other, it could very well result in starvation without the intervention of an intentional God. So to me, those two stories are the same story.

How do you explain to people you really shouldn't misbehave because it could interfere with our coordination in a way that may result in us not having enough food to get through the winter? The answer is, oh, God sees what you're doing and he's not happy about it. And when God's not happy, starvation is highly likely. Right?

How do you explain to people you really shouldn't misbehave because it could interfere with our coordination in a way that may result in us not having enough food to get through the winter? The answer is, oh, God sees what you're doing and he's not happy about it. And when God's not happy, starvation is highly likely. Right?

How do you explain to people you really shouldn't misbehave because it could interfere with our coordination in a way that may result in us not having enough food to get through the winter? The answer is, oh, God sees what you're doing and he's not happy about it. And when God's not happy, starvation is highly likely. Right?

So the metanatural is the category that allows the reconciliation of the efficient narrative description of this process with the difficult to spot deeper

So the metanatural is the category that allows the reconciliation of the efficient narrative description of this process with the difficult to spot deeper

So the metanatural is the category that allows the reconciliation of the efficient narrative description of this process with the difficult to spot deeper

And we're right. Well, I wouldn't say outside of our senses. I would say outside of our consciousness. Okay. And so the distinction is like this. Our consciousness is late evolving. It shows up at the end of our evolutionary story, not early. And, you know, that means that there are a good many mammals that have some degree of consciousness that we can see, but nobody's conscious like we are.

And we're right. Well, I wouldn't say outside of our senses. I would say outside of our consciousness. Okay. And so the distinction is like this. Our consciousness is late evolving. It shows up at the end of our evolutionary story, not early. And, you know, that means that there are a good many mammals that have some degree of consciousness that we can see, but nobody's conscious like we are.

And we're right. Well, I wouldn't say outside of our senses. I would say outside of our consciousness. Okay. And so the distinction is like this. Our consciousness is late evolving. It shows up at the end of our evolutionary story, not early. And, you know, that means that there are a good many mammals that have some degree of consciousness that we can see, but nobody's conscious like we are.

The conscious mind, I will argue, is actually evolved for an initial purpose. The initial purpose is exactly what we are doing right now. It is the ability for two minds to pool their understanding.

The conscious mind, I will argue, is actually evolved for an initial purpose. The initial purpose is exactly what we are doing right now. It is the ability for two minds to pool their understanding.

The conscious mind, I will argue, is actually evolved for an initial purpose. The initial purpose is exactly what we are doing right now. It is the ability for two minds to pool their understanding.

to actually plug into each other and reach an emergent conclusion that neither of us could reach alone or that the two of us couldn't reach separately if we couldn't plug our consciousnesses into each other. So when we say actually that we know things, but we don't know how we know them,

to actually plug into each other and reach an emergent conclusion that neither of us could reach alone or that the two of us couldn't reach separately if we couldn't plug our consciousnesses into each other. So when we say actually that we know things, but we don't know how we know them,

to actually plug into each other and reach an emergent conclusion that neither of us could reach alone or that the two of us couldn't reach separately if we couldn't plug our consciousnesses into each other. So when we say actually that we know things, but we don't know how we know them,

We're sort of talking about our conscious minds, which are just this thin sliver on top of this architecture that has been knowing things for millions of years in ways that weren't conscious at all. So I think we're really – it's that interface. Does my conscious mind know why I know this to be true? Why do I meet somebody and –

We're sort of talking about our conscious minds, which are just this thin sliver on top of this architecture that has been knowing things for millions of years in ways that weren't conscious at all. So I think we're really – it's that interface. Does my conscious mind know why I know this to be true? Why do I meet somebody and –

We're sort of talking about our conscious minds, which are just this thin sliver on top of this architecture that has been knowing things for millions of years in ways that weren't conscious at all. So I think we're really – it's that interface. Does my conscious mind know why I know this to be true? Why do I meet somebody and –

have a distrust that turns out to be accurate with respect to their trustworthiness, right? I can try to piece it together. I may get nowhere. And it may be that there's a lot that I actually did perceive. It came in through my eyes and my ears and who knows what else. But it is my conscious mind's difficulty in describing it that feels like my entire mind was handed this piece of information.