Bryan Appleyard

model of the same car every year which had very little difference but he would say you had to have the new car and people had if the people saw their neighbors had the new car they then went out and bought one themselves so he created a marketing system which is kind of like the parallel of Ford's production system but applied to marketing and it was just hugely successful but it didn't produce great cars

There was a brilliant, brilliant Japanese engineer called Taichi Ohno. And he was working for Toyota, as it was called now, and later Toyota, because Westerners found it easier to pronounce. And he developed a new production system based upon Ford's production system, Ford and General Motors production systems. But when he looked at the production system, he could see all these flaws.

There was a brilliant, brilliant Japanese engineer called Taichi Ohno. And he was working for Toyota, as it was called now, and later Toyota, because Westerners found it easier to pronounce. And he developed a new production system based upon Ford's production system, Ford and General Motors production systems. But when he looked at the production system, he could see all these flaws.

There was a brilliant, brilliant Japanese engineer called Taichi Ohno. And he was working for Toyota, as it was called now, and later Toyota, because Westerners found it easier to pronounce. And he developed a new production system based upon Ford's production system, Ford and General Motors production systems. But when he looked at the production system, he could see all these flaws.

One of the key flaws was that if you have men doing one thing at a time, Occasionally they'll do it wrong and it would go to the end of the line and you'd have to take the car and put it all right. So all these Ford type production systems had a sort of room beyond the production line where they were putting cars right. He saw this as catastrophic and stupid.

One of the key flaws was that if you have men doing one thing at a time, Occasionally they'll do it wrong and it would go to the end of the line and you'd have to take the car and put it all right. So all these Ford type production systems had a sort of room beyond the production line where they were putting cars right. He saw this as catastrophic and stupid.

One of the key flaws was that if you have men doing one thing at a time, Occasionally they'll do it wrong and it would go to the end of the line and you'd have to take the car and put it all right. So all these Ford type production systems had a sort of room beyond the production line where they were putting cars right. He saw this as catastrophic and stupid.

And he designed that out by saying any worker working on the line who saw a mistake or a fault could stop the entire line. Which sounds like craziness, because you'd think that has reduced production. But of course it didn't, because you had to work out why exactly it had stopped, what had gone wrong, get it right, so it would never go right and wrong again.

And he designed that out by saying any worker working on the line who saw a mistake or a fault could stop the entire line. Which sounds like craziness, because you'd think that has reduced production. But of course it didn't, because you had to work out why exactly it had stopped, what had gone wrong, get it right, so it would never go right and wrong again.

And he designed that out by saying any worker working on the line who saw a mistake or a fault could stop the entire line. Which sounds like craziness, because you'd think that has reduced production. But of course it didn't, because you had to work out why exactly it had stopped, what had gone wrong, get it right, so it would never go right and wrong again.

Whereas the Fordian system was reproducing the same errors, but just fixing them at the end. That's a huge change. Combined with this other change, which was that Ford just got his stuff delivered or manufactured it himself at River Rouge, and just chucked it into the bins where the workers were working. But Ono said, no, no, we're not paying for all that stock.

Whereas the Fordian system was reproducing the same errors, but just fixing them at the end. That's a huge change. Combined with this other change, which was that Ford just got his stuff delivered or manufactured it himself at River Rouge, and just chucked it into the bins where the workers were working. But Ono said, no, no, we're not paying for all that stock.

Whereas the Fordian system was reproducing the same errors, but just fixing them at the end. That's a huge change. Combined with this other change, which was that Ford just got his stuff delivered or manufactured it himself at River Rouge, and just chucked it into the bins where the workers were working. But Ono said, no, no, we're not paying for all that stock.

We're just going to make sure that the things arrive just in time. So he created the just-in-time production system. Now, it took a while for it to work. The problem was that Americans were resistant to non-Detroit cars or non-American cars generally.

We're just going to make sure that the things arrive just in time. So he created the just-in-time production system. Now, it took a while for it to work. The problem was that Americans were resistant to non-Detroit cars or non-American cars generally.

We're just going to make sure that the things arrive just in time. So he created the just-in-time production system. Now, it took a while for it to work. The problem was that Americans were resistant to non-Detroit cars or non-American cars generally.

And the only car that was making any inroads was the German Volkswagen Beetle, and it was being bought by young people who regarded it as deviant, eccentric, wicked, you know, because they bought this car. But it was a groovy car. When it really got going, everybody wanted one. And that was a sign, a warning that Detroit should have noticed, but it didn't, or it decided to ignore it.

And the only car that was making any inroads was the German Volkswagen Beetle, and it was being bought by young people who regarded it as deviant, eccentric, wicked, you know, because they bought this car. But it was a groovy car. When it really got going, everybody wanted one. And that was a sign, a warning that Detroit should have noticed, but it didn't, or it decided to ignore it.

And the only car that was making any inroads was the German Volkswagen Beetle, and it was being bought by young people who regarded it as deviant, eccentric, wicked, you know, because they bought this car. But it was a groovy car. When it really got going, everybody wanted one. And that was a sign, a warning that Detroit should have noticed, but it didn't, or it decided to ignore it.

And along came the Japanese. First of all, they started to invade the market in the 50s and 60s and make serious inroads thereafter. And this appealed to young people because young people were increasingly anti-corporate in those days. So they thought, we'll stick it to the man in Detroit and buy a Japanese car. And again, the Detroit didn't believe it at first.