Dan Elitzer

Right.

You get grief attack.

Yeah.

again, given the interconnectedness we see across the system, yeah, you can start griefing systems or you can be trying to say like, hey, we're trying to mess with this protocol over here.

So we're going to trigger circuit breakers in this other protocol.

So users can't then like pull liquidity over here to go rescue positions over there.

There are a lot of additional kind of like second and third order effects that you need to think about when you're implementing both rate limits and circuit breakers.

Potentially.

It depends on, like, I think Aave v4 has more tools that could have mitigated it.

But again, it comes down to the implementation.

Layer 0 had more ways that you could have used their infrastructure to make this safer that then weren't used in this case.

So just the mere existence of Aave B4 would not have lessened the impact here, but it is possible using some of the tools available in Aave B4, it could have limited the damage.

I also want to make clear it's not just an L2 issue, right?

This, if we start to see a future administration or any government start to come down, the idea that they could start making demands of node operators on L1

to, you know, not sequence transactions for certain addresses or to all agree to a fork where there's an irregular state change, like absolutely pressure could come to L1s as well.

So I think ultimately at the end of the day for all of these systems, the ultimate, ultimate, ultimate root of trust comes down to the social layer, right?

And so I think we just need to be aware of that.

And I think while I do think that this was a good action in this case, when we view it in isolation, I think, you know, were I on the Security Council, I likely would have gone along with this.

I...

I think that a lot of people who are right to celebrate it in the moment, we're going to look back on this and it really has the potential to set bad precedents in a lot of ways going forward.