Dan Epps

Because it would just be individual property owner's choice shaping whether the weapon was able to be brought on the property.

But I think they matter because we assume, and this seems accurate, that most property owners and most businesses are just not going to

make an explicit choice one way or the other.

So this is a default rule that is going to control a large number of cases in places.

So I guess kind of the question in this case, so this is, to back it up one second, this law and several other states' laws like it were passed in the wake of the court's decision in Bruin, right, which, you know, I'd say expanded the scope of Second Amendment rights or at least elucidated the court's understanding of Second Amendment rights in a way that does, you know,

you know, limit what states can do.

And so this is a potential workaround.

Yeah.

And so the weird thing about the case is...

this is sort of what I was getting at earlier, there's kind of disagreement about whether this is a Second Amendment case at all, if that makes sense, right?

It's like, do you even, is this just a property case, right?

Is this just a question about, you know, how a state shapes its property rules?

And obviously those choices might have downstream implications for people's ability to carry weapons, right?

Or is this just a case about, you know, the state trying to burden a right directly?

In part, I guess that's because there's a well-established default rule there that you're not allowed to spray paint on someone's house unless they give you permission to do so.

I guess so.

Do you think you can have a default rule that just says you can't go up to someone's door, period, regardless of the purpose?

Okay.

And that is a property rule, right?

Because, you know, the property owner owns the walkway up to their door.