Daniel P. Driscoll

They absolutely love training with it.

And we're putting in a lot of instances, the computer programmers, the developers, the manufacturers,

at JROTC, at our training sites with our soldiers, and the innovation loop is closing down.

And so what's there is getting tighter.

And so what's happening is that the types of things that are being offered are better.

So then that's good.

The next part of it was how do we actually start to procure that stuff?

How do we buy things quickly at smaller scales?

So instead of having onesie twosie tryouts in the field, how can we have units starting to buy stuff?

We've always been able to do it a bit.

with our special forces our ranger battalion they've been able to do these things but our conventional army has not and they just function differently and so we wanted to take a lot of that model and apply it to the main army and so for these isvs it was a really successful process where we essentially said cut all the we're not going to wind the procurement process through these 16 steps where anyone along the way can say no and then it starts back over

And then, oh, by the way, everyone at each of those 16 steps has for the last 30 or 40 years in the bureaucracy been incentivized to do nothing.

Basically, the only way you get in trouble as a civilian operating in the Pentagon is to do something that goes wrong.

So there's two ways to avoid that.

Way one is do things and not have it go wrong.

But just as equally effective for your own career is to do nothing.

So you're just incentivized to have the safety culture where you say no and just try to make it your entire time without doing anything.

And these are not bad people.

They're not patriotic.

It's just that's the incentive structure.