Danielle Jablanski

As they should.

about all these technological advances and satellite imagery about our second strike capability and how many seconds we need to be able to respond.

And so there's a huge debate.

There has been for 10 plus years in the nuclear weapons community of whether or not there's this dead hand reaction of an automatic second strike capability.

And what really kind of threw that off years ago was social media.

So how do you confirm things happening in real time that take review, revision, quality analysis to say, yes, this did happen or no, that didn't happen?

And we were seeing all these tests out of North Korea and actually people were finding out about the missiles tests on Twitter faster than any government agency could confirm or deny it.

So you could actually create this misinformation capacity that would then skew your response.

Of course, weapon systems are not... There's not a really great analogy to most of the OT, right?

But if you're talking about mean time to recovery and dollars that amount to seconds or minutes down, there is a large impact typically.

So the safety aspect works sometimes, but then other times it's just mission critical, right?

You have to do it because it's demanded of you.

And so...

When actually when I got to SCV, when they hired me, I was like, this needs to be part of our standard of care.

Like if we're doing engineering anywhere in the world, we need to offer cybersecurity as a greenfield recommendations.

Like if we have people working on HVAC and we say we're going to build this building and here's the list of the systems that go into that.

We need to do one more step and say, of these systems, these ones have vulnerability disclosure processes.

These ones require compensating controls.

These ones are a little bit more insecure by design.

These ones have black encryption, right?