Daphne Halikiopoulou

So the far-right is on the rise everywhere in Europe.

Now, this is different from a while ago.

Just until recently, I used to use Spain or Portugal as examples of countries that didn't have the far-right as a significant force.

And the problem is not just that these parties are getting a lot of votes.

The problem is that many of these parties are now in government.

Look at Italy, for example.

Look at Hungary.

Look at countries in Scandinavia.

Or when they're not in government, they are actual contenders for it.

I don't want to think about the next French presidential election or many other countries where these parties are significantly contending for power.

Now, why is that?

And why do other parties, more importantly, think that in order to defeat the far right, they need to copy the far right, they need to become the far right?

Well, that is because we hear a story, wherever we look at why this is happening, the story we hear is that, well, you know, it's all about immigration.

It's all about culture.

It's all about people now not wanting globalization, not wanting immigrants, not wanting transnationalism, people just wanting nationalist politics.

And all the parties are doing is that they are responding to this kind of popular demand, as we call it in academia, and therefore the far-right is on the rise.

And what I want to do is debunk this myth and sort of disagree with this and say this is not

a simple story at all and it's not a story only about immigration and it's not a story only about culture.

Actually, what it is, is on what we call in academia the demand side or the people or the insecurities that drive people to vote for particular parties are multiple and extend way beyond culture, they extend way beyond immigration.

But on the supply, or in other words, the parties themselves,