Darrell Campbell

Yes, but not for the reasons that people think. So the one of the things to understand about aviation is like in the 1950s and the 1960s, airplanes would crash for reasons that now seem like boneheaded things like they didn't really understand how to make them properly or people didn't know how to, you know, tell the pilot that he's screwing up or anything like that.

Yes, but not for the reasons that people think. So the one of the things to understand about aviation is like in the 1950s and the 1960s, airplanes would crash for reasons that now seem like boneheaded things like they didn't really understand how to make them properly or people didn't know how to, you know, tell the pilot that he's screwing up or anything like that.

And so we've actually ironed out most of the big issues. obvious hazards in aviation. So paradoxically, when something happens now, it's because a lot of individual things happened, each of which reduced the margin of safety just by a little bit, but then enough of them added up so that it actually caused a disaster.

And so we've actually ironed out most of the big issues. obvious hazards in aviation. So paradoxically, when something happens now, it's because a lot of individual things happened, each of which reduced the margin of safety just by a little bit, but then enough of them added up so that it actually caused a disaster.

And so we've actually ironed out most of the big issues. obvious hazards in aviation. So paradoxically, when something happens now, it's because a lot of individual things happened, each of which reduced the margin of safety just by a little bit, but then enough of them added up so that it actually caused a disaster.

In the context of the American Airlines mid-air collision outside of D.C., we had a last-minute runway change. We had a pilot on the helicopter who was on what's called a checkride, so she was essentially getting tested on her abilities. We had a simultaneous radio transmission where the helicopter pilots didn't hear an important piece of information from air traffic control.

In the context of the American Airlines mid-air collision outside of D.C., we had a last-minute runway change. We had a pilot on the helicopter who was on what's called a checkride, so she was essentially getting tested on her abilities. We had a simultaneous radio transmission where the helicopter pilots didn't hear an important piece of information from air traffic control.

In the context of the American Airlines mid-air collision outside of D.C., we had a last-minute runway change. We had a pilot on the helicopter who was on what's called a checkride, so she was essentially getting tested on her abilities. We had a simultaneous radio transmission where the helicopter pilots didn't hear an important piece of information from air traffic control.

PAX25, pass on to CRJ.

PAX25, pass on to CRJ.

PAX25, pass on to CRJ.

And then we know that they were looking at what was probably a different airplane than the one they were tracking. So again, each one of those things wouldn't have caused an accident by itself, but all of them happened simultaneously. And then also against the background of air traffic control being understaffed and really overworked, especially at Reagan Airport.

And then we know that they were looking at what was probably a different airplane than the one they were tracking. So again, each one of those things wouldn't have caused an accident by itself, but all of them happened simultaneously. And then also against the background of air traffic control being understaffed and really overworked, especially at Reagan Airport.

And then we know that they were looking at what was probably a different airplane than the one they were tracking. So again, each one of those things wouldn't have caused an accident by itself, but all of them happened simultaneously. And then also against the background of air traffic control being understaffed and really overworked, especially at Reagan Airport.

It just made all of these things line up in such a way that sort of catastrophe followed.

It just made all of these things line up in such a way that sort of catastrophe followed.

It just made all of these things line up in such a way that sort of catastrophe followed.

There's, I think, a couple of things that the aviation system already does that address that. So a lot of it is like, if you remember the movie Sully with Tom Hanks.

There's, I think, a couple of things that the aviation system already does that address that. So a lot of it is like, if you remember the movie Sully with Tom Hanks.

There's, I think, a couple of things that the aviation system already does that address that. So a lot of it is like, if you remember the movie Sully with Tom Hanks.