Darren Farber

And look, the institutional shareholders are In the primes, like the Boeings of the world and the T-Rows that own Boeing and stuff like that or Capital or whoever, they're going to management at these primes and going, you guys do all the design and these guys make all the money, two and a half times the margin. Tell me how that works.

And look, the institutional shareholders are In the primes, like the Boeings of the world and the T-Rows that own Boeing and stuff like that or Capital or whoever, they're going to management at these primes and going, you guys do all the design and these guys make all the money, two and a half times the margin. Tell me how that works.

And so, look, at some point you kick the bear long enough or you pick the elephant's food off long enough and the paradigm will change. And so what's that number? Yeah. Is it $5 billion of EBITDA? I don't know, but you're seeing competitors already. And so that quantum of profit is also attracting competitors into the system. And that's meaningful.

And so, look, at some point you kick the bear long enough or you pick the elephant's food off long enough and the paradigm will change. And so what's that number? Yeah. Is it $5 billion of EBITDA? I don't know, but you're seeing competitors already. And so that quantum of profit is also attracting competitors into the system. And that's meaningful.

And so when you make that much money for that long, and look, Laura went public, obviously, in a pretty spectacular way. That used to sit inside of JLL. It's a private equity firm. And so it went public at about $150. 30 some odd million of EBITDA. And it trades at 50 times because there's a general expectation that off of a smaller basis, it's easier to run the TransLine playbook over again.

And so when you make that much money for that long, and look, Laura went public, obviously, in a pretty spectacular way. That used to sit inside of JLL. It's a private equity firm. And so it went public at about $150. 30 some odd million of EBITDA. And it trades at 50 times because there's a general expectation that off of a smaller basis, it's easier to run the TransLine playbook over again.

And just, I think it's going to be harder at a certain size, but when you're Pluto and the market is Jupiter, it works. I just don't know how long it works for. And if Boeing continues to get smaller and that quantum of profit gets more and more meaningful, I think it's going to be harder.

And just, I think it's going to be harder at a certain size, but when you're Pluto and the market is Jupiter, it works. I just don't know how long it works for. And if Boeing continues to get smaller and that quantum of profit gets more and more meaningful, I think it's going to be harder.

I remember this conversation.

I remember this conversation.

I wish it was more complicated. Then maybe it could justify my existence a little bit better. So what I want to see are structural impediments for you getting into my business. Why was I able to buy the nation's only maker of missile fuel? Think about it. We're like eight people in a house plant in an office park in suburban Washington, D.C. Why do I get to buy that capability?

I wish it was more complicated. Then maybe it could justify my existence a little bit better. So what I want to see are structural impediments for you getting into my business. Why was I able to buy the nation's only maker of missile fuel? Think about it. We're like eight people in a house plant in an office park in suburban Washington, D.C. Why do I get to buy that capability?

Why does the prime buy it? Why don't they verticalize? On the cover, that business was very low growth. It didn't seem terribly interesting to someone. The margins weren't transline margins, let's just say. And so business has imputed growth of 100 basis points. It has huge contingent risk. The largest non-nuclear explosion in U.S. history was the former plant.

Why does the prime buy it? Why don't they verticalize? On the cover, that business was very low growth. It didn't seem terribly interesting to someone. The margins weren't transline margins, let's just say. And so business has imputed growth of 100 basis points. It has huge contingent risk. The largest non-nuclear explosion in U.S. history was the former plant.

There's a Discovery Channel episode on this thing. The blast threw planes off the tarmac at McCarran. And the department's like, yeah, we're going to move this factory to the Utah desert. And so our view is we want to own the defense annuities. But when we analyzed the factory and the cost to replace it, we said, oh, it's $2 billion. That was our number.

There's a Discovery Channel episode on this thing. The blast threw planes off the tarmac at McCarran. And the department's like, yeah, we're going to move this factory to the Utah desert. And so our view is we want to own the defense annuities. But when we analyzed the factory and the cost to replace it, we said, oh, it's $2 billion. That was our number.

Now, there's a group in the Pentagon that does this for a living, cost assessment and program evaluation. This is a good use property. of taxpayer money and those should not cut this because this is an analysis of our industrial capability to produce at scale to fight contingencies globally. So there's a real thinking that happens in the Pentagon there about this thing blows up.

Now, there's a group in the Pentagon that does this for a living, cost assessment and program evaluation. This is a good use property. of taxpayer money and those should not cut this because this is an analysis of our industrial capability to produce at scale to fight contingencies globally. So there's a real thinking that happens in the Pentagon there about this thing blows up.

How much do we need to invest in order to create another source of supply? And by the way, the defense establishment is littered with monopolies because the defense market is the opposite of a monopoly. It's a monopsony. It's one customer, many suppliers. And so if you have one customer in a business, how much capital are you going to deploy into your factory?

How much do we need to invest in order to create another source of supply? And by the way, the defense establishment is littered with monopolies because the defense market is the opposite of a monopoly. It's a monopsony. It's one customer, many suppliers. And so if you have one customer in a business, how much capital are you going to deploy into your factory?