Darren Farber

where young people want to go into defense technology outside of the five-sided building, as we call it. Is there an analog in China? He goes, oh, no. He goes, Chinese entrepreneurs want to tap into the American market. They want to be able to sell their product. It's so funny. The young people there are just as capitalistic, but the incentive structure in the PLA is not there.

where young people want to go into defense technology outside of the five-sided building, as we call it. Is there an analog in China? He goes, oh, no. He goes, Chinese entrepreneurs want to tap into the American market. They want to be able to sell their product. It's so funny. The young people there are just as capitalistic, but the incentive structure in the PLA is not there.

And so I think that's a huge edge for us. I also think our ability to fight joint warfare. is a huge edge for us for now. Describe what that means. Every war we fight is joint in that it's all the services together integrated, working together. And it's widely regarded that the PLA and their setup, there's an enormous lack of trust up and down the chain of command.

And so I think that's a huge edge for us. I also think our ability to fight joint warfare. is a huge edge for us for now. Describe what that means. Every war we fight is joint in that it's all the services together integrated, working together. And it's widely regarded that the PLA and their setup, there's an enormous lack of trust up and down the chain of command.

There's a worry about corruption. And so Even in the vertical of the individual chain of command, let's say in their army or in their air force, it becomes even harder when you have to have a joint operation. And we went through this here in the United States.

There's a worry about corruption. And so Even in the vertical of the individual chain of command, let's say in their army or in their air force, it becomes even harder when you have to have a joint operation. And we went through this here in the United States.

We had this thing called Goldwater-Nichols, which said, if you're going to be a commander in the military, 06 or above, you're going to get a joint assignment. We're going to make this service joint so we can fully project the power of each branch of the service. And we work in concert together. We're not competing with each other. The Chinese have never fought a joint war.

We had this thing called Goldwater-Nichols, which said, if you're going to be a commander in the military, 06 or above, you're going to get a joint assignment. We're going to make this service joint so we can fully project the power of each branch of the service. And we work in concert together. We're not competing with each other. The Chinese have never fought a joint war.

They have these branches of services. They built all this technological capability, but their ability necessarily to exercise in this joint concept is very unclear, especially when there's low trust in command and control. So the flip side to that is I could see a scenario where the Chinese hand over command and control to an AI to overcome

They have these branches of services. They built all this technological capability, but their ability necessarily to exercise in this joint concept is very unclear, especially when there's low trust in command and control. So the flip side to that is I could see a scenario where the Chinese hand over command and control to an AI to overcome

The institutional resistance and the lack of trust up and down and across the branches of services, because that thing would be dispassionate and would start tasking it. And I actually think that they have a much stronger incentive to push the bleeding edge there of adaptation, of planning the war with AI, because they're fundamentally less joint. They're not trained in a joint way.

The institutional resistance and the lack of trust up and down and across the branches of services, because that thing would be dispassionate and would start tasking it. And I actually think that they have a much stronger incentive to push the bleeding edge there of adaptation, of planning the war with AI, because they're fundamentally less joint. They're not trained in a joint way.

Because they have to rely on it more, that adaptation may happen faster. Whereas we have a very successful joint capability. And so maybe we'll be less inclined to change. That's what I worry about now is this new capability of a thinking machine. But maybe it can overcome the institutional weakness of their military.

Because they have to rely on it more, that adaptation may happen faster. Whereas we have a very successful joint capability. And so maybe we'll be less inclined to change. That's what I worry about now is this new capability of a thinking machine. But maybe it can overcome the institutional weakness of their military.

I think it's going to be extremely hard for us to stop the Chinese from a Taiwanese invasion. And I asked a former secretary of defense probably two or three months ago, I said, do we have a moral obligation to defend Taiwan? Not... Can we do it tactically? Because that's always an engineering problem and a massing problem and a planning problem.

I think it's going to be extremely hard for us to stop the Chinese from a Taiwanese invasion. And I asked a former secretary of defense probably two or three months ago, I said, do we have a moral obligation to defend Taiwan? Not... Can we do it tactically? Because that's always an engineering problem and a massing problem and a planning problem.

And ultimately, we can run the simulations and maybe there are these outcomes where we can make a dent in it. And I believe that the moral will of the country actually drives all that other activity. I'm not giving it away because it's only been male secretary defenses, but his answer was, I don't know. And I was flabbergasted by it because I thought I understood his politics.

And ultimately, we can run the simulations and maybe there are these outcomes where we can make a dent in it. And I believe that the moral will of the country actually drives all that other activity. I'm not giving it away because it's only been male secretary defenses, but his answer was, I don't know. And I was flabbergasted by it because I thought I understood his politics.

What it tells me is, is that I think the vast majority of both sides of the aisle don't view it as the moral obligation of the United States to protect Taiwan. It's interesting because I wonder if it's the case because people think we can't win. We can't win in a conventional sense. And if it was a cakewalk for us to win, would we just do it? I happen to believe the latter.

What it tells me is, is that I think the vast majority of both sides of the aisle don't view it as the moral obligation of the United States to protect Taiwan. It's interesting because I wonder if it's the case because people think we can't win. We can't win in a conventional sense. And if it was a cakewalk for us to win, would we just do it? I happen to believe the latter.