Daryl Levinson

And how we've done it is kind of interesting. Though you come in, it sounds like, you know, based on your local intellectual milieu, you maybe pre-persuaded that constitutional law and international law are alike in these ways.

And how we've done it is kind of interesting. Though you come in, it sounds like, you know, based on your local intellectual milieu, you maybe pre-persuaded that constitutional law and international law are alike in these ways.

Whereas I had thought that the book would be shocking because most people would have your other view of constitutional law as real law and would only see international law as fake.

Whereas I had thought that the book would be shocking because most people would have your other view of constitutional law as real law and would only see international law as fake.

I don't know the answer, but I know the forms of the answer that could be most plausible. And they track the forms of answers that international relations theorists have developed over a really long period of time. I guess the baseline would be a kind of realism that denies that there is much of any legal compliance either in the international arena or in constitutional law.

I don't know the answer, but I know the forms of the answer that could be most plausible. And they track the forms of answers that international relations theorists have developed over a really long period of time. I guess the baseline would be a kind of realism that denies that there is much of any legal compliance either in the international arena or in constitutional law.

And the way that kind of argument spins is – Oh, yeah, we see powerful people, you know, doing the stuff that the Constitution says sometimes. But that's probably just because of coincidence of interest. It just so happens to serve their interest that the government is structured in this way because this is the structural system that brought them to power in the first place.

And the way that kind of argument spins is – Oh, yeah, we see powerful people, you know, doing the stuff that the Constitution says sometimes. But that's probably just because of coincidence of interest. It just so happens to serve their interest that the government is structured in this way because this is the structural system that brought them to power in the first place.

So why would they mess with it? You know, the president of the United States likes being commander in chief, so respects the commander in chief clause, that kind of thing. And then moving from that baseline of sort of skeptical realism, you get rational kinds of theories of longer term or broader self-interest. So international law, this is rational institutionalism.

So why would they mess with it? You know, the president of the United States likes being commander in chief, so respects the commander in chief clause, that kind of thing. And then moving from that baseline of sort of skeptical realism, you get rational kinds of theories of longer term or broader self-interest. So international law, this is rational institutionalism.

The constitutional equivalents have been developed by various political scientists. And the basic lines of argument are, you know, repeat play in a kind of prisoner dilemma situation or coordination games where it is in the enlightened long term self-interest of powerful political actors. to coordinate or cooperate around constitutional rules and constitutional institutions.

The constitutional equivalents have been developed by various political scientists. And the basic lines of argument are, you know, repeat play in a kind of prisoner dilemma situation or coordination games where it is in the enlightened long term self-interest of powerful political actors. to coordinate or cooperate around constitutional rules and constitutional institutions.

And those stories can be developed at the level of specific arrangements like Senate filibuster. Like, I don't know whether my party is going to be in the majority or the minority over the medium term. So I'm okay allowing minority vetoes even when I'm in the majority because I'm going to get to veto majority. when the table turns to democracy.

And those stories can be developed at the level of specific arrangements like Senate filibuster. Like, I don't know whether my party is going to be in the majority or the minority over the medium term. So I'm okay allowing minority vetoes even when I'm in the majority because I'm going to get to veto majority. when the table turns to democracy.

I don't know whether we're going to be in the majority or the minority, but I'm willing to respect the results of this election because I think I'm going to win the next election. And in any event, it's better than fighting a war or a civil war about who's going to control the state.

I don't know whether we're going to be in the majority or the minority, but I'm willing to respect the results of this election because I think I'm going to win the next election. And in any event, it's better than fighting a war or a civil war about who's going to control the state.

So that's an approach, a rational approach, but not focused on immediate self-interest, but on longer term self-interest. And then there are approaches that aren't rationalist in that way. In international relations, we call this constructivism approach.

So that's an approach, a rational approach, but not focused on immediate self-interest, but on longer term self-interest. And then there are approaches that aren't rationalist in that way. In international relations, we call this constructivism approach.

The idea that law actually shapes people's interests, self-image, preferences, and there is some pull towards legal compliance that goes beyond rational calculations. Maybe there's some inherent desire to comply with law. or something else. And in constitutional law, ideas like that show up in arguments about legitimation. Is the Supreme Court a legitimate institution?

The idea that law actually shapes people's interests, self-image, preferences, and there is some pull towards legal compliance that goes beyond rational calculations. Maybe there's some inherent desire to comply with law. or something else. And in constitutional law, ideas like that show up in arguments about legitimation. Is the Supreme Court a legitimate institution?