Daryl Levinson

Why do people who lose Supreme Court cases nonetheless support the Supreme Court and provide a reservoir of diffuse support for the justices? And what determines whether people are willing to afford the court that kind of legitimacy? Is it the appearance that the court is doing some kind of law instead of politics? Is it the robes? Is it something else?

Why do people who lose Supreme Court cases nonetheless support the Supreme Court and provide a reservoir of diffuse support for the justices? And what determines whether people are willing to afford the court that kind of legitimacy? Is it the appearance that the court is doing some kind of law instead of politics? Is it the robes? Is it something else?

So those are the basic tracks that I think align in international law and constitutional law that are probably our best hope of explaining why legal compliance works to the extent it does.

So those are the basic tracks that I think align in international law and constitutional law that are probably our best hope of explaining why legal compliance works to the extent it does.

I thought before I heard Will today that the reason was because everyone in constitutional law took for granted that this was a solid legal structure that worked like contract law worked. So why do scholars of contract law not spend all their time worrying about whether contracts will be enforced by courts or whether contracts

I thought before I heard Will today that the reason was because everyone in constitutional law took for granted that this was a solid legal structure that worked like contract law worked. So why do scholars of contract law not spend all their time worrying about whether contracts will be enforced by courts or whether contracts

People will acknowledge contracts as a legal form and instead talk about the actual law of contracts or contract design. It's because they take for granted that the system is basically going to work and courts are going to enforce contracts to the best of their abilities. And people are going to use contracts to order their arrangements.

People will acknowledge contracts as a legal form and instead talk about the actual law of contracts or contract design. It's because they take for granted that the system is basically going to work and courts are going to enforce contracts to the best of their abilities. And people are going to use contracts to order their arrangements.

And the law is going to work kind of like the law works with some ambiguity, but with some things that everyone more or less agrees on. And I thought that's how people thought about constitutional law as well. So they didn't have to worry about the big structural things and was the system going to hold up or fail or why would it fail and could just get on to how the system works internally.

And the law is going to work kind of like the law works with some ambiguity, but with some things that everyone more or less agrees on. And I thought that's how people thought about constitutional law as well. So they didn't have to worry about the big structural things and was the system going to hold up or fail or why would it fail and could just get on to how the system works internally.

And to the extent that there were constitutionalists who were concerned about the kinds of issues that I take up in the book, there were mostly people working in political science departments who were taking an external perspective on the operation of the legal system rather than an internal perspective.

And to the extent that there were constitutionalists who were concerned about the kinds of issues that I take up in the book, there were mostly people working in political science departments who were taking an external perspective on the operation of the legal system rather than an internal perspective.

And I think that it's interesting that that division exists in constitutional law, though perhaps not surprising since until quite recently, the same – Institutional division of labor existed between scholars of international relations and political science departments and elsewhere and international lawyers who also just took for granted that international law worked. International law was law.

And I think that it's interesting that that division exists in constitutional law, though perhaps not surprising since until quite recently, the same – Institutional division of labor existed between scholars of international relations and political science departments and elsewhere and international lawyers who also just took for granted that international law worked. International law was law.

What mattered was figuring out what the law is or what the law normatively should be. not big picture questions about the operation of the system.

What mattered was figuring out what the law is or what the law normatively should be. not big picture questions about the operation of the system.

And it was only quite recently in the last 25 years or so that there was more of a merger of those two methodological approaches and more international lawyers started asking questions about the relationship between what the law is and what the law can be given the structural arrangements that limit what international law can accomplish. and how the institutions and the substantive law interact.

And it was only quite recently in the last 25 years or so that there was more of a merger of those two methodological approaches and more international lawyers started asking questions about the relationship between what the law is and what the law can be given the structural arrangements that limit what international law can accomplish. and how the institutions and the substantive law interact.

And I think a movement like that in constitutional law and constitutional theory might be an interesting form of progress.

And I think a movement like that in constitutional law and constitutional theory might be an interesting form of progress.