David French

have really bristled at because they look at these multi-member commissions as almost creating a kind of a new branch of government.

They're not really under the control of the legislature.

They're not really totally control of the president.

They result in, in the conservative argument, one that I happen to share, they result in kind of an entrenched bureaucracy that isn't really accountable

purely accountable to the president, not purely accountable to Congress, not really accountable to the people because it's so far removed from the people.

And this is kind of a legacy and hangover of the progressive era, sort of this idea that, you know, look, administrative states need a lot of technocratic expertise and we need to insulate technocratic expertise from political accountability.

And, you know, there are problems attached to that.

The way I've described what's going on here with the court is we're very much, Tim, at what I would say a fork in the road.

Think of it as we've got one of two destinations, the good place or the bad place.

Nope, nope, nope.

It's one or the other, Tim.

It's one or the other.

Sorry, it's to use the old, old phrase, turn or burn.

Like those are your two options, right?

So here's the bad place.

And then I'll tell you the good place.

The bad place would be if the Supreme Court does what I think has been kind of consistent with originalist philosophy forever and ever and said, wait, these hybrid agencies are structurally not in conformance with the Constitution.

If it's an executive agency, it's got to be under the president.

If you wanted something under with Congress having a lot of control, you create a legislative agency like the Congressional Budget Office created at the tail end of the Nixon era.

But the bad outcome would be, OK, you give the president greater authority over the executive branch.