Dr. Marcel Dirsus

But then in Belarus, what you saw is that dictators can maximize their chances of survival by bringing in security forces from elsewhere. Because, of course, you are going to be much more likely to shoot somebody from a foreign country than you would be your neighbors or maybe somebody from your family. So what you saw in Minsk is essentially a form of dictatorial solidarity there.

where the dictatorship was able to count on these Russians, and these Russians not only made it less likely that the regime would crumble under the weight of its own repression, but it also reassured regime elites, like the generals and so forth, that the regime would continue to survive.

where the dictatorship was able to count on these Russians, and these Russians not only made it less likely that the regime would crumble under the weight of its own repression, but it also reassured regime elites, like the generals and so forth, that the regime would continue to survive.

where the dictatorship was able to count on these Russians, and these Russians not only made it less likely that the regime would crumble under the weight of its own repression, but it also reassured regime elites, like the generals and so forth, that the regime would continue to survive.

And given that they then thought the regime would continue to survive, it became irrational to defect, which otherwise they would have potentially done.

And given that they then thought the regime would continue to survive, it became irrational to defect, which otherwise they would have potentially done.

And given that they then thought the regime would continue to survive, it became irrational to defect, which otherwise they would have potentially done.

In dictatorships, there's a very small line between apparent stability and complete chaos. And the reason for that is that so much of these regimes is built on strength and about these perceptions of inevitability. So as soon as people come to think that the leader could actually fall...

In dictatorships, there's a very small line between apparent stability and complete chaos. And the reason for that is that so much of these regimes is built on strength and about these perceptions of inevitability. So as soon as people come to think that the leader could actually fall...

In dictatorships, there's a very small line between apparent stability and complete chaos. And the reason for that is that so much of these regimes is built on strength and about these perceptions of inevitability. So as soon as people come to think that the leader could actually fall...

or will actually fall, they can switch sides just like that, because there's no bigger ideological project, there's no legitimacy, it's just about maximizing your own interests, staying out of prison, and staying alive. And that's why you saw, for example, in the case of Assad, once his soldiers came to realize that he might actually lose, they just took off their uniforms, and off they went.

or will actually fall, they can switch sides just like that, because there's no bigger ideological project, there's no legitimacy, it's just about maximizing your own interests, staying out of prison, and staying alive. And that's why you saw, for example, in the case of Assad, once his soldiers came to realize that he might actually lose, they just took off their uniforms, and off they went.

or will actually fall, they can switch sides just like that, because there's no bigger ideological project, there's no legitimacy, it's just about maximizing your own interests, staying out of prison, and staying alive. And that's why you saw, for example, in the case of Assad, once his soldiers came to realize that he might actually lose, they just took off their uniforms, and off they went.

So authoritarian stability is often a mirage. The other thing that I would say, though, is we often tell ourselves that conflicts can only be won if we win hearts and minds. That's a lie. For these regimes, that's a lie. For us, to an extent, it's possible because we have legal and ethical constraints that we cannot simply bomb civilians into submission.

So authoritarian stability is often a mirage. The other thing that I would say, though, is we often tell ourselves that conflicts can only be won if we win hearts and minds. That's a lie. For these regimes, that's a lie. For us, to an extent, it's possible because we have legal and ethical constraints that we cannot simply bomb civilians into submission.

So authoritarian stability is often a mirage. The other thing that I would say, though, is we often tell ourselves that conflicts can only be won if we win hearts and minds. That's a lie. For these regimes, that's a lie. For us, to an extent, it's possible because we have legal and ethical constraints that we cannot simply bomb civilians into submission.

But if you're a Putin or if you're Assad or if you're Lukashenko, you absolutely can. If you are able to use brutal violence for an extended period of time, you can stay in power even if the vast majority of your own people hate you. as depressing as that is.

But if you're a Putin or if you're Assad or if you're Lukashenko, you absolutely can. If you are able to use brutal violence for an extended period of time, you can stay in power even if the vast majority of your own people hate you. as depressing as that is.

But if you're a Putin or if you're Assad or if you're Lukashenko, you absolutely can. If you are able to use brutal violence for an extended period of time, you can stay in power even if the vast majority of your own people hate you. as depressing as that is.

There's no Western leader that I would call a tyrant or that I would call a dictator, but that doesn't necessarily mean that they don't want to be one. And democracy is not God-given. So it could be that in the future, we see a European country or a North American country turning into a dictatorship. I try to end the book sort of on a positive note, but I do actually also think it's true.