Eric Levitz

The Nationalist Right has this narrative in which we used to have these really tight-knit communities anchored by stable families in which the male breadwinner worked in a factory. And this not only allowed for

The Nationalist Right has this narrative in which we used to have these really tight-knit communities anchored by stable families in which the male breadwinner worked in a factory. And this not only allowed for

The Nationalist Right has this narrative in which we used to have these really tight-knit communities anchored by stable families in which the male breadwinner worked in a factory. And this not only allowed for

working class wage growth and upward mobility and the achievement of the american dream but also for these really healthy family arrangements stable two-parent homes and generally a form of communitarian life that the religious right really values and then there also is this gender element to it

working class wage growth and upward mobility and the achievement of the american dream but also for these really healthy family arrangements stable two-parent homes and generally a form of communitarian life that the religious right really values and then there also is this gender element to it

working class wage growth and upward mobility and the achievement of the american dream but also for these really healthy family arrangements stable two-parent homes and generally a form of communitarian life that the religious right really values and then there also is this gender element to it

where a manufacturing economy puts a premium on brute physical strength, or at least the manufacturing economy of the mid-20th century. These were predominantly male jobs.

where a manufacturing economy puts a premium on brute physical strength, or at least the manufacturing economy of the mid-20th century. These were predominantly male jobs.

where a manufacturing economy puts a premium on brute physical strength, or at least the manufacturing economy of the mid-20th century. These were predominantly male jobs.

And, you know, this connection between the nostalgia for manufacturing and the nostalgia for a kind of different set of gender relations was made really explicit by a speech from Republican Senator Josh Hawley in 2021, where he said...

And, you know, this connection between the nostalgia for manufacturing and the nostalgia for a kind of different set of gender relations was made really explicit by a speech from Republican Senator Josh Hawley in 2021, where he said...

And, you know, this connection between the nostalgia for manufacturing and the nostalgia for a kind of different set of gender relations was made really explicit by a speech from Republican Senator Josh Hawley in 2021, where he said...

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

And so they tell this story that you hear in a lot of Trump's speeches, in the speeches of other right-wing nationalists, in which deindustrialization, the closing of factories, is synonymous with both economic devastation and decline and moral rot.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

So I think that there actually is some evidence that there is a link there. I think that there's even stronger evidence that there is something to be nostalgic about in the economics here because during the time in the 1950s when America had kind of its peak of manufacturing as a share of the labor force, you also did really see high rates of wage growth, high rates of social mobility.

People born into the bottom of the American class hierarchy were more likely to move up than they are today. And you also saw just a lot of opportunity for blue collar workers. In absolute terms, Americans are much better off materially today than they are in the 1950s. But in terms of the level of progress, the pace of moving up, this was better back in that era.

People born into the bottom of the American class hierarchy were more likely to move up than they are today. And you also saw just a lot of opportunity for blue collar workers. In absolute terms, Americans are much better off materially today than they are in the 1950s. But in terms of the level of progress, the pace of moving up, this was better back in that era.