Ezra Klein

But it also sort of develops an industrial base. It becomes, as it does not become more like us, becomes dangerous, you know, at least in our view, right? You don't want to ever have a conflict with another country who you've outsourced your key industrial base to. And so you have to sort of follow that order. And then, again, here, things that would have been ridiculous

But it also sort of develops an industrial base. It becomes, as it does not become more like us, becomes dangerous, you know, at least in our view, right? You don't want to ever have a conflict with another country who you've outsourced your key industrial base to. And so you have to sort of follow that order. And then, again, here, things that would have been ridiculous

But it also sort of develops an industrial base. It becomes, as it does not become more like us, becomes dangerous, you know, at least in our view, right? You don't want to ever have a conflict with another country who you've outsourced your key industrial base to. And so you have to sort of follow that order. And then, again, here, things that would have been ridiculous

at one point in American politics and become possible. Bernie Sanders is one of them, right? The idea that you would have somebody, a self-described socialist running for president and coming anywhere near the Democratic nomination, that was unthinkable in 2004. And by 2016, it almost happened. And Donald Trump is another thing.

at one point in American politics and become possible. Bernie Sanders is one of them, right? The idea that you would have somebody, a self-described socialist running for president and coming anywhere near the Democratic nomination, that was unthinkable in 2004. And by 2016, it almost happened. And Donald Trump is another thing.

at one point in American politics and become possible. Bernie Sanders is one of them, right? The idea that you would have somebody, a self-described socialist running for president and coming anywhere near the Democratic nomination, that was unthinkable in 2004. And by 2016, it almost happened. And Donald Trump is another thing.

Donald Trump runs like headlong into the failures of neoliberalism in the Republican Party. He runs against trade. He runs against a sort of Paul Ryan, more open immigration. George W. Bush and John McCain were both very big on liberalizing immigration policy. He runs against the Iraq war and, you know, sort of foreign adventurism. And there's a sort of isolationist instinct that

Donald Trump runs like headlong into the failures of neoliberalism in the Republican Party. He runs against trade. He runs against a sort of Paul Ryan, more open immigration. George W. Bush and John McCain were both very big on liberalizing immigration policy. He runs against the Iraq war and, you know, sort of foreign adventurism. And there's a sort of isolationist instinct that

Donald Trump runs like headlong into the failures of neoliberalism in the Republican Party. He runs against trade. He runs against a sort of Paul Ryan, more open immigration. George W. Bush and John McCain were both very big on liberalizing immigration policy. He runs against the Iraq war and, you know, sort of foreign adventurism. And there's a sort of isolationist instinct that

coexists very awkwardly now within a territorial expansionist instinct, but at least in 2016, it was more isolationist.

coexists very awkwardly now within a territorial expansionist instinct, but at least in 2016, it was more isolationist.

coexists very awkwardly now within a territorial expansionist instinct, but at least in 2016, it was more isolationist.

And so Donald Trump and his sort of reimagining of the Republican Party as a right-wing populist, more like sort of some Christian Democratic parties in other countries, you know, up in that quadrant of socially conservative, economically populist, that becomes something that's possible. But nothing has found an equilibrium. Right. Nobody's agreed to the other side's premises.

And so Donald Trump and his sort of reimagining of the Republican Party as a right-wing populist, more like sort of some Christian Democratic parties in other countries, you know, up in that quadrant of socially conservative, economically populist, that becomes something that's possible. But nothing has found an equilibrium. Right. Nobody's agreed to the other side's premises.

And so Donald Trump and his sort of reimagining of the Republican Party as a right-wing populist, more like sort of some Christian Democratic parties in other countries, you know, up in that quadrant of socially conservative, economically populist, that becomes something that's possible. But nothing has found an equilibrium. Right. Nobody's agreed to the other side's premises.

There are certain ones that people are agreeing on. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have very different view on China now. Right. Like Biden kept a lot of Trump's policies on China and actually strengthened them. And now Trump is building on that aggressively again. But in terms of the other things, there isn't agreement about what the next period in American politics should look like.

There are certain ones that people are agreeing on. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have very different view on China now. Right. Like Biden kept a lot of Trump's policies on China and actually strengthened them. And now Trump is building on that aggressively again. But in terms of the other things, there isn't agreement about what the next period in American politics should look like.

There are certain ones that people are agreeing on. Both the Republican and Democratic parties have very different view on China now. Right. Like Biden kept a lot of Trump's policies on China and actually strengthened them. And now Trump is building on that aggressively again. But in terms of the other things, there isn't agreement about what the next period in American politics should look like.

And that's one reason I think it's very dangerous, both as a question of media strategy, but also as a question of politics, to code people, places, platforms too tightly. Republicans and Democrats aren't going to get along in Congress. That has to do with, I think, the incentives of Congress. My first book is called Why We're Polarized.

And that's one reason I think it's very dangerous, both as a question of media strategy, but also as a question of politics, to code people, places, platforms too tightly. Republicans and Democrats aren't going to get along in Congress. That has to do with, I think, the incentives of Congress. My first book is called Why We're Polarized.