Fareed Zakaria

And the threat of the abandonment of the United States is actually more significant than the threat of Russian aggression. And so they will probably spend more. They will coordinate more on defense. Maybe they'll even do more. I think that the fundamental issue with productivity in Europe is much larger than the U.S. or Russia.

And the threat of the abandonment of the United States is actually more significant than the threat of Russian aggression. And so they will probably spend more. They will coordinate more on defense. Maybe they'll even do more. I think that the fundamental issue with productivity in Europe is much larger than the U.S. or Russia.

Seeing where the total factor productivity rises in Europe over the next five years is maybe unrelated, but I do think they will coordinate more in defense. They'll coordinate more in foreign policy. They'll spend more. What you will lose is they will be less deferential to the United States.

Seeing where the total factor productivity rises in Europe over the next five years is maybe unrelated, but I do think they will coordinate more in defense. They'll coordinate more in foreign policy. They'll spend more. What you will lose is they will be less deferential to the United States.

Right. I was about to say, we had a system where We kind of ran the world. We ran the world because the European Union essentially did exactly what we wanted them to and was a satellite of the United States. So we would be experimenting with a different system. Yeah, the Europeans will spend more. You know, it is worth pointing out it's

Right. I was about to say, we had a system where We kind of ran the world. We ran the world because the European Union essentially did exactly what we wanted them to and was a satellite of the United States. So we would be experimenting with a different system. Yeah, the Europeans will spend more. You know, it is worth pointing out it's

There was a reason we wanted to denationalize the foreign and defense policies of countries like Germany. And Germany in particular, trapped in the center of Europe, has always had a difficult time having a kind of sensible, moderate foreign policy. So there were great virtues to saying to the Germans, you know what, guys, don't worry so much about your security. We'll take care of it.

There was a reason we wanted to denationalize the foreign and defense policies of countries like Germany. And Germany in particular, trapped in the center of Europe, has always had a difficult time having a kind of sensible, moderate foreign policy. So there were great virtues to saying to the Germans, you know what, guys, don't worry so much about your security. We'll take care of it.

For the last hundred years, when you've worried about it, things haven't turned out so well. And I think Germany is a completely different country now, but it is taking us into a different world. By the way, there will be no defense savings out of all this.

For the last hundred years, when you've worried about it, things haven't turned out so well. And I think Germany is a completely different country now, but it is taking us into a different world. By the way, there will be no defense savings out of all this.

The idea that the United States will be able to spend less because the Europeans are spending more misunderstands what our defense budget is about. We are the only global superpower. We are trying to be engaged in every part of the world. I mean, this is a president who says we should be in Gaza. We have to deter the Japanese.

The idea that the United States will be able to spend less because the Europeans are spending more misunderstands what our defense budget is about. We are the only global superpower. We are trying to be engaged in every part of the world. I mean, this is a president who says we should be in Gaza. We have to deter the Japanese.

We need Greenland because we want to be able to be sure that we control the Arctic. And by the way, we need to be controlling the Panama Canal. You know, that's the way even Trump conceives of America's role. So there's going to be no defense savings. So at the end of the day, yeah, it's possible that we get a more independent Europe that spends more on defense.

We need Greenland because we want to be able to be sure that we control the Arctic. And by the way, we need to be controlling the Panama Canal. You know, that's the way even Trump conceives of America's role. So there's going to be no defense savings. So at the end of the day, yeah, it's possible that we get a more independent Europe that spends more on defense.

I think I would prefer a kind of tough love approach where there was actually some love.

I think I would prefer a kind of tough love approach where there was actually some love.

Again, you know, with Trump, so much of it is personal. So the reason he seems to have moved on TikTok is because he realized that there was a large group of people supporting him on TikTok. TikTok was good for him. It was a good platform for him to get his message out. And it's possible sometimes with Trump that it's as simple as that. But I think that...

Again, you know, with Trump, so much of it is personal. So the reason he seems to have moved on TikTok is because he realized that there was a large group of people supporting him on TikTok. TikTok was good for him. It was a good platform for him to get his message out. And it's possible sometimes with Trump that it's as simple as that. But I think that...

With China, you have always had this conflicting pressure. And you saw it in Trump 1, in 1.0. He was hostile to China in the campaign. He talked about massive tariffs against China. And he comes in and he invites Xi Jinping to Mar-a-Lago. And he's...

With China, you have always had this conflicting pressure. And you saw it in Trump 1, in 1.0. He was hostile to China in the campaign. He talked about massive tariffs against China. And he comes in and he invites Xi Jinping to Mar-a-Lago. And he's...