Gili Raanan

And that really accelerated things for Wiz. And in three months, we faced one major dilemma. We could go for a low entry point price product to get a lot of logos and build with from the ground up, bottom up, or what people in Silicon Valley call PLG, product-led growth, or go after very large deals, enterprise deals to begin with, and grow the ARR top line.

And that really accelerated things for Wiz. And in three months, we faced one major dilemma. We could go for a low entry point price product to get a lot of logos and build with from the ground up, bottom up, or what people in Silicon Valley call PLG, product-led growth, or go after very large deals, enterprise deals to begin with, and grow the ARR top line.

Unlike the common wisdom within Silicon Valley, we decided to go for the large deals, scrap PLG, and go for real enterprise deals to begin with. We thought that by growing our top-line ARR, we would be better off. We would have real commitment by highly sophisticated customers. We would attract attention from outside investors. We would attract attention from top go-to-market talent.

Unlike the common wisdom within Silicon Valley, we decided to go for the large deals, scrap PLG, and go for real enterprise deals to begin with. We thought that by growing our top-line ARR, we would be better off. We would have real commitment by highly sophisticated customers. We would attract attention from outside investors. We would attract attention from top go-to-market talent.

And that would enable us to build a significant business. And while we spent the first 12 months building a product, the next four quarters were quite unusual. The company closed a million dollars in ARR in the first quarter of selling the software. $2 million, I think $8 million, and then $25 million in the fourth quarter.

And that would enable us to build a significant business. And while we spent the first 12 months building a product, the next four quarters were quite unusual. The company closed a million dollars in ARR in the first quarter of selling the software. $2 million, I think $8 million, and then $25 million in the fourth quarter.

It was an incredible company from the moment we actually launched our go-to-market for those three reasons. Focus on the urgent, not the important. Build a product that has a terrific product market fit for one person, one real person that owns the budget, the authority, and the ability to use the product. And we went and sold that to large organizations at a high price point.

It was an incredible company from the moment we actually launched our go-to-market for those three reasons. Focus on the urgent, not the important. Build a product that has a terrific product market fit for one person, one real person that owns the budget, the authority, and the ability to use the product. And we went and sold that to large organizations at a high price point.

That actually was an old lesson I learned at Sequoia many years ago, that the expensive deals, the pricey companies are pricier from day one. They're always expensive. They're expensive at the seed round, they're expensive at the A round, they're expensive at the B round. The worst reason for a venture capitalist to pass on an opportunity is for price, because it's part of those companies' DNA.

That actually was an old lesson I learned at Sequoia many years ago, that the expensive deals, the pricey companies are pricier from day one. They're always expensive. They're expensive at the seed round, they're expensive at the A round, they're expensive at the B round. The worst reason for a venture capitalist to pass on an opportunity is for price, because it's part of those companies' DNA.

Pick a company. All of those companies were expensive. Airbnb was expensive. Instagram was expensive. So if you're going to pass on an opportunity just because of price, you're going to pass on all the good companies.

Pick a company. All of those companies were expensive. Airbnb was expensive. Instagram was expensive. So if you're going to pass on an opportunity just because of price, you're going to pass on all the good companies.

Yes, Wiz was super expensive to begin with and attracted a lot of attention and became the fastest unicorn, the fastest company to go to $100 million, the fastest company to get to $500 million. And this year, when we get to a billion-dollar ARR, it's probably going to be the fastest SaaS company to get to a billion-dollar ARR. But that's part of the DNA. It's a fast company.

Yes, Wiz was super expensive to begin with and attracted a lot of attention and became the fastest unicorn, the fastest company to go to $100 million, the fastest company to get to $500 million. And this year, when we get to a billion-dollar ARR, it's probably going to be the fastest SaaS company to get to a billion-dollar ARR. But that's part of the DNA. It's a fast company.

Watching that just convinced me that as an investor, a high price company is actually a good thing, not a bad thing, if justified.

Watching that just convinced me that as an investor, a high price company is actually a good thing, not a bad thing, if justified.

The productivity at Wiz, if you look, was second to none. And when I looked at the number of engineers relative to the number of products and the number of capabilities we delivered annually. It was amazing. And when I look at the way we source engineers, there's always a debate. How do you pick the best engineers? And who are the best engineers for your business?

The productivity at Wiz, if you look, was second to none. And when I looked at the number of engineers relative to the number of products and the number of capabilities we delivered annually. It was amazing. And when I look at the way we source engineers, there's always a debate. How do you pick the best engineers? And who are the best engineers for your business?

And I discussed that with Roy Resnick, the VP of R&D of Waze, one of the co-founders, one of the four co-founders. And he had a super special way to source engineers. He would not just source smart engineers who has been in good companies beforehand, terrific education, et cetera. He would source people that their hobby is writing code.

And I discussed that with Roy Resnick, the VP of R&D of Waze, one of the co-founders, one of the four co-founders. And he had a super special way to source engineers. He would not just source smart engineers who has been in good companies beforehand, terrific education, et cetera. He would source people that their hobby is writing code.