Gillian Metzger

I agree. I agree. I think there are some factors that complicate the assessment a little bit in terms of some decisions that have pulled back on administrative power compared to presidential power.

I agree. I agree. I think there are some factors that complicate the assessment a little bit in terms of some decisions that have pulled back on administrative power compared to presidential power.

But when you're focusing on presidential power specifically, the president's control of the executive branch or the most recent immunity decision, the president's immunity from prosecution, those are decisions in areas where the president's powers have really been expanded.

But when you're focusing on presidential power specifically, the president's control of the executive branch or the most recent immunity decision, the president's immunity from prosecution, those are decisions in areas where the president's powers have really been expanded.

I think a couple are really significant. I mean, I think it's really an unprecedented expansion of immunity for the president. The court divided up the instances when the president would be immune into a couple of different camps.

I think a couple are really significant. I mean, I think it's really an unprecedented expansion of immunity for the president. The court divided up the instances when the president would be immune into a couple of different camps.

So one of them has to do with what we might call core or exclusive presidential powers, where the president has authority and it can't be intruded on, for example, by Congress. In that area, what was really striking was how broadly the court viewed what counted as core power, including things like

So one of them has to do with what we might call core or exclusive presidential powers, where the president has authority and it can't be intruded on, for example, by Congress. In that area, what was really striking was how broadly the court viewed what counted as core power, including things like

prosecution and investigation, suggesting that maybe Congress can't impose restrictions on how those are undertaken, which would be really quite novel. The other aspect was one that you mentioned about how broadly it viewed official acts and the tests that it established as to when immunity would apply.

prosecution and investigation, suggesting that maybe Congress can't impose restrictions on how those are undertaken, which would be really quite novel. The other aspect was one that you mentioned about how broadly it viewed official acts and the tests that it established as to when immunity would apply.

And it said the immunity would be presumptive, but it's kind of hard to see how that presumption is going to be overturned because Immunity is going to be there unless the government can show there's no intrusion on the president's power. That's a really high bar.

And it said the immunity would be presumptive, but it's kind of hard to see how that presumption is going to be overturned because Immunity is going to be there unless the government can show there's no intrusion on the president's power. That's a really high bar.

And so for a vast area of actions, anything up to the outermost perimeter of the president's official authority, all of that are areas in which the president's going to be immune. And that's a pretty significant move.

And so for a vast area of actions, anything up to the outermost perimeter of the president's official authority, all of that are areas in which the president's going to be immune. And that's a pretty significant move.

That's true. They may not be exactly the same. And the focus on immunity for the president, I think, allowed the court to think that it could use some broader phrasing than had it really been thinking about the respective authority of Congress and the president in this area, that it might be more willing to acknowledge Congress has more of a role to play here. But I think you're really right.

That's true. They may not be exactly the same. And the focus on immunity for the president, I think, allowed the court to think that it could use some broader phrasing than had it really been thinking about the respective authority of Congress and the president in this area, that it might be more willing to acknowledge Congress has more of a role to play here. But I think you're really right.

I mean, one of the interesting things, particularly post-Nixon, is how much attention has been paid to try and ensure the independence of prosecution and investigation to make sure that those tremendous powers of the government are not used to serve presidents' political goals. And this opinion seems oblivious or to intentionally get rid of that.

I mean, one of the interesting things, particularly post-Nixon, is how much attention has been paid to try and ensure the independence of prosecution and investigation to make sure that those tremendous powers of the government are not used to serve presidents' political goals. And this opinion seems oblivious or to intentionally get rid of that.

I think if you focus on the language of the opinion, they were bullseye on the president and really concerned about future administrations calling former presidents into court and the kind of abuse that our polarized politics might lead to.

I think if you focus on the language of the opinion, they were bullseye on the president and really concerned about future administrations calling former presidents into court and the kind of abuse that our polarized politics might lead to.