Gillian Metzger

I don't think they took a broader view and thought about all of the individuals and officials that the president would need to be interacting with in order to exercise his presidential power. And I think it really would be a significant move to say all of those people are now immune. That said, the way the president exercises power is through other officials.

I don't think they took a broader view and thought about all of the individuals and officials that the president would need to be interacting with in order to exercise his presidential power. And I think it really would be a significant move to say all of those people are now immune. That said, the way the president exercises power is through other officials.

The president doesn't directly engage in prosecution or investigation. So it's somewhat naive to think that if you're talking about this as a core presidential power, that it's not going to have an overhang, at least for a lot of officials with whom the president has to engage in order for him to exercise that power.

The president doesn't directly engage in prosecution or investigation. So it's somewhat naive to think that if you're talking about this as a core presidential power, that it's not going to have an overhang, at least for a lot of officials with whom the president has to engage in order for him to exercise that power.

Right. I think it also connects to the theoretical underpinnings that the decision reveals. And that's the connection here to this idea of what's called often unitary executive theory. And the idea is actually that indeed all executive power reposes in the president.

Right. I think it also connects to the theoretical underpinnings that the decision reveals. And that's the connection here to this idea of what's called often unitary executive theory. And the idea is actually that indeed all executive power reposes in the president.

And if you take that view and then you have the language that says the president is a branch of government, again, it's unclear how you're going to pull out those other officials and say Congress can regulate and impose liability on them, but not on the president.

And if you take that view and then you have the language that says the president is a branch of government, again, it's unclear how you're going to pull out those other officials and say Congress can regulate and impose liability on them, but not on the president.

I think that's right. And I would think that the underlings would also be careful about that. That said, there's one aspect of the immunity decision that I don't think has gotten that much play. One of the things that knowing the president and others may be liable for criminal prosecution does is it affects what happens inside the government.

I think that's right. And I would think that the underlings would also be careful about that. That said, there's one aspect of the immunity decision that I don't think has gotten that much play. One of the things that knowing the president and others may be liable for criminal prosecution does is it affects what happens inside the government.

And it affects the ability of executive branch lawyers to push back at actions that violate the law and to make clear the kind of consequences that violating the law could mean. If you've got immunity outside, then you can't make arguments based on those kinds of legal consequences that are going to carry as much weight inside the government.

And it affects the ability of executive branch lawyers to push back at actions that violate the law and to make clear the kind of consequences that violating the law could mean. If you've got immunity outside, then you can't make arguments based on those kinds of legal consequences that are going to carry as much weight inside the government.

I think that's right. You know, then what you're relying on is going to be the officials pushing back, but the president may very well then fire them until we get somebody who's more complacent.

I think that's right. You know, then what you're relying on is going to be the officials pushing back, but the president may very well then fire them until we get somebody who's more complacent.

Sure. So there's actually a lengthy history of removal restrictions and also debate over them. And as you note in your question, the nature of the position makes a difference in terms of whether or not you might think that a cause removal restriction is appropriate. The court in the 1920s invalidated a removal restriction for a postmaster.

Sure. So there's actually a lengthy history of removal restrictions and also debate over them. And as you note in your question, the nature of the position makes a difference in terms of whether or not you might think that a cause removal restriction is appropriate. The court in the 1920s invalidated a removal restriction for a postmaster.

But pretty much since then, it has upheld a whole slew of for-cause removal protections. One of the most important decisions came in 1935, and it involved the Federal Trade Commission. And there, the court upheld a for-cause removal restriction for the members of the commission at the very top of the agency.

But pretty much since then, it has upheld a whole slew of for-cause removal protections. One of the most important decisions came in 1935, and it involved the Federal Trade Commission. And there, the court upheld a for-cause removal restriction for the members of the commission at the very top of the agency.

And, you know, the court argued that they were exercising more quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative authority, but didn't seem to have any qualms about the fact that you could protect them from presidential removal.

And, you know, the court argued that they were exercising more quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative authority, but didn't seem to have any qualms about the fact that you could protect them from presidential removal.