Graeme Wood

exactly how much damage was done to Qatar's gas infrastructure, exactly how much damage is likely to be done if there's an escalation of the war to Saudi Arabia, to Kuwait, and so forth.

So these become more real as the war fails to find a resolution.

I mean, I've been reporting for the last week or so about exactly what a hard hit to that energy infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and Qatar would look like.

And there are particular nodes where if you hit them, it takes years to recover.

And taking that much oil and gas offline, it's almost impossible to overstate how serious a blow that is to the world's economy.

So

Iran has demonstrated very clearly that if it wants to hit an area that is, you know, 10 meters by 10 meters on an American airbase in Saudi Arabia, it can do that.

So if they want to do the same thing on an oil field, which cannot fly away, cannot have a hardened shelter built over it, then why couldn't they do that too?

This is, I think, totally within their capability.

Yeah, that's right.

And probably the most clear illustration so far of the failure of the United States to prepare for a very predictable threat, which is a drone attack of the sort that Ukraine and Russia has been perfecting for years now.

So if they can do that to one of the most valuable air assets the United States has, then they can do it to a piece of refinery equipment that's

you know, been sitting out under open skies for years.

And those things, again, can take years to replace.

Yeah, you know, in some way, China already is a protector.

And let me explain that.

A huge percentage of that oil that exits Saudi Arabia is going to China.

So if Iran were to destroy that hydrocarbon infrastructure of the Arab states, then China would be hurt.

So if China wants to say, and I would say if I were China, don't do that, don't do anything irreversible to that oil infrastructure, then

then Iran would probably have to listen because China is one of the few remaining friends that it has.