Hal Puthoff

So-called Robertson panel went out of their way to say this is all nonsense. So that was something you're dealing with. So there you realize, well, if I come forward and say there's really something to this, I'm really blasting through quite a brick wall here. But in the intervening decades, I think we've gotten to a point where The reasons we had to not do it then are no longer applicable.

So-called Robertson panel went out of their way to say this is all nonsense. So that was something you're dealing with. So there you realize, well, if I come forward and say there's really something to this, I'm really blasting through quite a brick wall here. But in the intervening decades, I think we've gotten to a point where The reasons we had to not do it then are no longer applicable.

But some of the concerns we had discussed then are still applicable and we have to pay attention to them. So I think, for example, this film that you saw that had its premiere at South by Southwest that Dan Farrow put out, and an upcoming book coming out by Jay Stratton who wrote was in charge of the UAP Task Force. These kind of things are going to accelerate that option.

But some of the concerns we had discussed then are still applicable and we have to pay attention to them. So I think, for example, this film that you saw that had its premiere at South by Southwest that Dan Farrow put out, and an upcoming book coming out by Jay Stratton who wrote was in charge of the UAP Task Force. These kind of things are going to accelerate that option.

But some of the concerns we had discussed then are still applicable and we have to pay attention to them. So I think, for example, this film that you saw that had its premiere at South by Southwest that Dan Farrow put out, and an upcoming book coming out by Jay Stratton who wrote was in charge of the UAP Task Force. These kind of things are going to accelerate that option.

And so I think it's only a matter, I mean, I would find it difficult to believe that within a decade we're not going to figure out how to do this and that there will be what you and I would call disclosure. but in a responsible way where we're not providing the enemy information they need. I mean, I recall when the DOD program was set up out of DIA, they said, well...

And so I think it's only a matter, I mean, I would find it difficult to believe that within a decade we're not going to figure out how to do this and that there will be what you and I would call disclosure. but in a responsible way where we're not providing the enemy information they need. I mean, I recall when the DOD program was set up out of DIA, they said, well...

And so I think it's only a matter, I mean, I would find it difficult to believe that within a decade we're not going to figure out how to do this and that there will be what you and I would call disclosure. but in a responsible way where we're not providing the enemy information they need. I mean, I recall when the DOD program was set up out of DIA, they said, well...

We need to investigate this to find out whose craft there are, you know, how do they run and whatever, whatever. And then the second reason was what if our potential adversaries get access or figure this out from their data collection before we do and they leap ahead of us. So it turned out that whole program was not based on one.

We need to investigate this to find out whose craft there are, you know, how do they run and whatever, whatever. And then the second reason was what if our potential adversaries get access or figure this out from their data collection before we do and they leap ahead of us. So it turned out that whole program was not based on one.

We need to investigate this to find out whose craft there are, you know, how do they run and whatever, whatever. And then the second reason was what if our potential adversaries get access or figure this out from their data collection before we do and they leap ahead of us. So it turned out that whole program was not based on one.

They couldn't care less where these things were coming from, what their intentions were. They're really worried about the possibility of an adversary getting ahead of us. So that was the driving force behind the whole program. Well, now having all these intervening years go by and, you know, there hasn't been any obvious super breakthrough by adversaries.

They couldn't care less where these things were coming from, what their intentions were. They're really worried about the possibility of an adversary getting ahead of us. So that was the driving force behind the whole program. Well, now having all these intervening years go by and, you know, there hasn't been any obvious super breakthrough by adversaries.

They couldn't care less where these things were coming from, what their intentions were. They're really worried about the possibility of an adversary getting ahead of us. So that was the driving force behind the whole program. Well, now having all these intervening years go by and, you know, there hasn't been any obvious super breakthrough by adversaries.

I think now is the time we could have a kind of a reconciliation process, make sure we don't put everybody in jail and anything to do with covering this up. provide proper lanes to bring various aspects of information forward. And so that's what I and colleagues that I interact with are trying to do today.

I think now is the time we could have a kind of a reconciliation process, make sure we don't put everybody in jail and anything to do with covering this up. provide proper lanes to bring various aspects of information forward. And so that's what I and colleagues that I interact with are trying to do today.

I think now is the time we could have a kind of a reconciliation process, make sure we don't put everybody in jail and anything to do with covering this up. provide proper lanes to bring various aspects of information forward. And so that's what I and colleagues that I interact with are trying to do today.

It is too much.

It is too much.

It is too much.