Hal Puthoff

There are really basically two levels of response. For example, some of the early work when we went to brief, we had 10 or 12 people and we're talking about the work. Pretty soon a guy in the back of the room jumps up and he says, I know what this is. This is some kind of PSYOP test of our gullibility. And I want you to know whoever's putting this out, I'm not buying it.

And he stormed out of the room. So that was one response. But there's a second response we got, which turned out to be interesting. At a certain point after we had done a number of years of successful work in doing the remote viewing, we had to keep briefing higher and higher, as you can imagine.

And he stormed out of the room. So that was one response. But there's a second response we got, which turned out to be interesting. At a certain point after we had done a number of years of successful work in doing the remote viewing, we had to keep briefing higher and higher, as you can imagine.

And he stormed out of the room. So that was one response. But there's a second response we got, which turned out to be interesting. At a certain point after we had done a number of years of successful work in doing the remote viewing, we had to keep briefing higher and higher, as you can imagine.

I hated briefing higher because if you brief a high-level guy and he says, oh, come on, this is nonsense, this is BS, that's the end of your programs. So I got it up to a point where, for example, I briefed Bill Casey, who was director of CIA under Reagan, and we had 45 minutes with him. And so I went through stuff like I've been describing for 45 minutes.

I hated briefing higher because if you brief a high-level guy and he says, oh, come on, this is nonsense, this is BS, that's the end of your programs. So I got it up to a point where, for example, I briefed Bill Casey, who was director of CIA under Reagan, and we had 45 minutes with him. And so I went through stuff like I've been describing for 45 minutes.

I hated briefing higher because if you brief a high-level guy and he says, oh, come on, this is nonsense, this is BS, that's the end of your programs. So I got it up to a point where, for example, I briefed Bill Casey, who was director of CIA under Reagan, and we had 45 minutes with him. And so I went through stuff like I've been describing for 45 minutes.

He got so entranced with it that he dismissed the rest of his afternoon calendar, and we spent five hours briefing him on that. So there was this funny thing where a certain level of people would just, ugh, this can't be. And then really high-level people seemed to be more open to it.

He got so entranced with it that he dismissed the rest of his afternoon calendar, and we spent five hours briefing him on that. So there was this funny thing where a certain level of people would just, ugh, this can't be. And then really high-level people seemed to be more open to it.

He got so entranced with it that he dismissed the rest of his afternoon calendar, and we spent five hours briefing him on that. So there was this funny thing where a certain level of people would just, ugh, this can't be. And then really high-level people seemed to be more open to it.

So actually we came up with a hypothesis and that is, okay, people who make it to the top of the food chain might be people who at some level inside themselves are, you know, they're always making decisions based on insufficient information and they end up making the right decision. That's how they got to where they are. So maybe this is some aspect that's at least at the unconscious level that

So actually we came up with a hypothesis and that is, okay, people who make it to the top of the food chain might be people who at some level inside themselves are, you know, they're always making decisions based on insufficient information and they end up making the right decision. That's how they got to where they are. So maybe this is some aspect that's at least at the unconscious level that

So actually we came up with a hypothesis and that is, okay, people who make it to the top of the food chain might be people who at some level inside themselves are, you know, they're always making decisions based on insufficient information and they end up making the right decision. That's how they got to where they are. So maybe this is some aspect that's at least at the unconscious level that

happening all the time. Well, that finally got put to a test because there were some parapsychologists who did some experiments with a meeting of CEOs of, I think 67 CEOs of major corporations, and had them try to guess the numbers that were going to be generated on the computer the next day. And so they did that. And it turned out that those who scored quite positively, significantly so,

happening all the time. Well, that finally got put to a test because there were some parapsychologists who did some experiments with a meeting of CEOs of, I think 67 CEOs of major corporations, and had them try to guess the numbers that were going to be generated on the computer the next day. And so they did that. And it turned out that those who scored quite positively, significantly so,

happening all the time. Well, that finally got put to a test because there were some parapsychologists who did some experiments with a meeting of CEOs of, I think 67 CEOs of major corporations, and had them try to guess the numbers that were going to be generated on the computer the next day. And so they did that. And it turned out that those who scored quite positively, significantly so,

When we interviewed them, it turned out they were the people who had the businesses that were really doing well. And the people who scored poorly had businesses that were kind of failing. So these investigators would ask them, well, are you using ESP or something? Do you have some glint of the future? He said, no, no, no, no, I don't believe any of that nonsense. But

When we interviewed them, it turned out they were the people who had the businesses that were really doing well. And the people who scored poorly had businesses that were kind of failing. So these investigators would ask them, well, are you using ESP or something? Do you have some glint of the future? He said, no, no, no, no, I don't believe any of that nonsense. But

When we interviewed them, it turned out they were the people who had the businesses that were really doing well. And the people who scored poorly had businesses that were kind of failing. So these investigators would ask them, well, are you using ESP or something? Do you have some glint of the future? He said, no, no, no, no, I don't believe any of that nonsense. But

I realize that when I trust my gut instinct, I'm usually right. So anyway, that sort of leads to the idea that this is a broadly available phenomenon.