Jake Sullivan

And every day I sat in this seat for four years, I was determined to ensure it did not happen. And I believe it does not have to happen. It is not inevitable by any stretch of the imagination. Now, taking a step back to the underlying premise of your question, which is, are we veering down an incredibly dangerous road with China that inevitably leads to conflict?

And every day I sat in this seat for four years, I was determined to ensure it did not happen. And I believe it does not have to happen. It is not inevitable by any stretch of the imagination. Now, taking a step back to the underlying premise of your question, which is, are we veering down an incredibly dangerous road with China that inevitably leads to conflict?

I also think the answer to that question is no. When I talk about China, I speak about two truths. One truth is China is trying to surpass the United States as the world's leading power, economically, technologically, diplomatically, militarily. They're trying to do so, and they have said so. President Xi has said so.

I also think the answer to that question is no. When I talk about China, I speak about two truths. One truth is China is trying to surpass the United States as the world's leading power, economically, technologically, diplomatically, militarily. They're trying to do so, and they have said so. President Xi has said so.

But we are also going to have to learn to live alongside China as a major power for the foreseeable future. That is also a reality. So our policy has to account for both of those realities. And for me, the best way to do that is to compete vigorously, but manage that competition so it doesn't veer into conflict, to maintain lines of communication.

But we are also going to have to learn to live alongside China as a major power for the foreseeable future. That is also a reality. So our policy has to account for both of those realities. And for me, the best way to do that is to compete vigorously, but manage that competition so it doesn't veer into conflict, to maintain lines of communication.

And I have spent, I think the technical term is umpteen hours with my counterpart in multiple countries around the world.

And I have spent, I think the technical term is umpteen hours with my counterpart in multiple countries around the world.

to manage the competition, including on the question of Taiwan, so that we don't end up in conflict with one another, so that we have a degree of stability in the relationship, and crucially, so that we can work together with China on issues where our interests align, where we do have to work together, whether it's on counter-narcotics and fentanyl precursors, or it's on climate, or it's on macroeconomic stability.

to manage the competition, including on the question of Taiwan, so that we don't end up in conflict with one another, so that we have a degree of stability in the relationship, and crucially, so that we can work together with China on issues where our interests align, where we do have to work together, whether it's on counter-narcotics and fentanyl precursors, or it's on climate, or it's on macroeconomic stability.

So I think, actually, if you look at particularly the last two years, where I've tried to intensify this channel and where President Biden has met twice with President Xi to convey a degree of stability in the relationship. We have worked hard to create space to compete, but also to create a floor in the relationship. And we believe we've done everything necessary to do so.

So I think, actually, if you look at particularly the last two years, where I've tried to intensify this channel and where President Biden has met twice with President Xi to convey a degree of stability in the relationship. We have worked hard to create space to compete, but also to create a floor in the relationship. And we believe we've done everything necessary to do so.

And we'll pass that off to the next team.

And we'll pass that off to the next team.

It's a question I think about a lot because a China that is struggling domestically, as you suggest in your question, may be looking abroad to deliver some sense of national purpose to its people, including through military conquest, including through something like trying to seize Taiwan militarily. I think that's a distinct risk. It's something we're going to have to look at quite carefully.

It's a question I think about a lot because a China that is struggling domestically, as you suggest in your question, may be looking abroad to deliver some sense of national purpose to its people, including through military conquest, including through something like trying to seize Taiwan militarily. I think that's a distinct risk. It's something we're going to have to look at quite carefully.

But I think that the jury is still out in exactly how this will impact Taiwan. the leadership in China, because frankly, I don't think they have yet entirely wrestled with the reality you just described.

But I think that the jury is still out in exactly how this will impact Taiwan. the leadership in China, because frankly, I don't think they have yet entirely wrestled with the reality you just described.

I think they have not fully yet incorporated the economic slowdown, the demographic challenges, and they have a residual confidence that they can manage and overcome those things as they have over the course of the past decade. So I'm not sure we're going to see a dramatic change in their policy, at least in the near term, because they have this reservoir of confidence built up.

I think they have not fully yet incorporated the economic slowdown, the demographic challenges, and they have a residual confidence that they can manage and overcome those things as they have over the course of the past decade. So I'm not sure we're going to see a dramatic change in their policy, at least in the near term, because they have this reservoir of confidence built up.