James Holland

And the problem with France in the 1930s is it's very politically divided.

It's a time of multiple governments, multiple prime ministers, coalition governments.

really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right, as well as the center.

really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right, as well as the center. And, you know, this is not a coalition of two parties. This is a coalition of multiple parties. No one can ever agree anything. I mean, that's the problem.

really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right, as well as the center. And, you know, this is not a coalition of two parties. This is a coalition of multiple parties. No one can ever agree anything. I mean, that's the problem.

really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right, as well as the center. And, you know, this is not a coalition of two parties. This is a coalition of multiple parties. No one can ever agree anything. I mean, that's the problem.

And, you know, this is not a coalition of two parties.

This is a coalition of multiple parties.

No one can ever agree anything.

I mean, that's the problem.

And it's amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, you know, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France, of border with Germany. which is kind of largely impregnable.

And it's amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, you know, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France, of border with Germany. which is kind of largely impregnable.

And it's amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, you know, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France, of border with Germany. which is kind of largely impregnable.

And it's amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, you know, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France of border with Germany.

which is kind of largely impregnable.

But the problem is there's a bit that's not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends and it sort of basically starts turning kind of towards in a kind of northerly direction and the border with Belgium.

But the problem is there's a bit that's not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends and it sort of basically starts turning kind of towards in a kind of northerly direction and the border with Belgium.

But the problem is there's a bit that's not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends and it sort of basically starts turning kind of towards in a kind of northerly direction and the border with Belgium.

But the problem is there's a bit that's not impregnable, which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends and it sort of basically starts turning kind of towards in a kind of northerly direction and the border with Belgium.

And, you know, what they should have done is built kind of border defences all along the northern coast with Belgium because Belgium refused to kind of allow any Allied troops into its territory. It was neutral. And France should have said, okay, fine. Well, then we'll defend, you know, we're not going to come to your rescue if you get invaded. That's the payoff.