Jennifer Burns

And so the Federal Reserve has stopped being an independent entity. It's just a sub sort of department of the Treasury. But in 1951, they negotiate what's called the Treasury-Fed Accord. And the Federal Reserve gets its independence, but it doesn't really use it. But statutorily, it now has it. And so most economists are just observing this.

a regime in which the Federal Reserve has no power, a regime in which there is really little inflation. The inflation that is seen is post the little burst of inflation in the Korean War. And they're saying inflation is not really important. It's not really relevant. And money is not really relevant and important.

a regime in which the Federal Reserve has no power, a regime in which there is really little inflation. The inflation that is seen is post the little burst of inflation in the Korean War. And they're saying inflation is not really important. It's not really relevant. And money is not really relevant and important.

a regime in which the Federal Reserve has no power, a regime in which there is really little inflation. The inflation that is seen is post the little burst of inflation in the Korean War. And they're saying inflation is not really important. It's not really relevant. And money is not really relevant and important.

And so to break through and to make the argument, that's why Friedman and Schwartz go to history. And they're able to make that argument for history. So then Friedman is coming out with a variety of papers that are saying, You know, when I look at economic fluctuations, he maps them side by side to fluctuations in the money supply and says, look, they fit.

And so to break through and to make the argument, that's why Friedman and Schwartz go to history. And they're able to make that argument for history. So then Friedman is coming out with a variety of papers that are saying, You know, when I look at economic fluctuations, he maps them side by side to fluctuations in the money supply and says, look, they fit.

And so to break through and to make the argument, that's why Friedman and Schwartz go to history. And they're able to make that argument for history. So then Friedman is coming out with a variety of papers that are saying, You know, when I look at economic fluctuations, he maps them side by side to fluctuations in the money supply and says, look, they fit.

And other economists, remember, they're building complicated mathematical models. And Friedman's doing extremely simple stuff. And they just think it's dumb. It's not interesting. It's not true. They just they don't buy it at all. And so but after a monetary history of the United States, they have to pay attention.

And other economists, remember, they're building complicated mathematical models. And Friedman's doing extremely simple stuff. And they just think it's dumb. It's not interesting. It's not true. They just they don't buy it at all. And so but after a monetary history of the United States, they have to pay attention.

And other economists, remember, they're building complicated mathematical models. And Friedman's doing extremely simple stuff. And they just think it's dumb. It's not interesting. It's not true. They just they don't buy it at all. And so but after a monetary history of the United States, they have to pay attention.

So it's really in those years, Friedman is hammering this idea of monetarism and it starts to become something respectable, bordering on respectable for other economists to look to and think about. And that's really the beginning of the kind of Keynesian monetarist split, where if you start to give Friedman any credence, You're heading towards a monetarist position.

So it's really in those years, Friedman is hammering this idea of monetarism and it starts to become something respectable, bordering on respectable for other economists to look to and think about. And that's really the beginning of the kind of Keynesian monetarist split, where if you start to give Friedman any credence, You're heading towards a monetarist position.

So it's really in those years, Friedman is hammering this idea of monetarism and it starts to become something respectable, bordering on respectable for other economists to look to and think about. And that's really the beginning of the kind of Keynesian monetarist split, where if you start to give Friedman any credence, You're heading towards a monetarist position.

Now, at the same time, Freeman comes out very publicly in 1964 as a supporter of Barry Goldwater. And Keynesian economics has found a home in the Democratic Party. It's probably brightest moment in the sun is the administration of John F. Kennedy, who brings in a lot of Harvard and Yale professors to the Council of Economic Advisors.

Now, at the same time, Freeman comes out very publicly in 1964 as a supporter of Barry Goldwater. And Keynesian economics has found a home in the Democratic Party. It's probably brightest moment in the sun is the administration of John F. Kennedy, who brings in a lot of Harvard and Yale professors to the Council of Economic Advisors.

Now, at the same time, Freeman comes out very publicly in 1964 as a supporter of Barry Goldwater. And Keynesian economics has found a home in the Democratic Party. It's probably brightest moment in the sun is the administration of John F. Kennedy, who brings in a lot of Harvard and Yale professors to the Council of Economic Advisors.

He proposes a series of spending programs that are really guided by the Keynesian philosophy. And Barry Goldwater is tremendously controversial, part for his votes against civil rights, which Friedman really supports, part because he's a hardcore libertarian in an age when that's not in the political mainstream or not discussed in the political mainstream.

He proposes a series of spending programs that are really guided by the Keynesian philosophy. And Barry Goldwater is tremendously controversial, part for his votes against civil rights, which Friedman really supports, part because he's a hardcore libertarian in an age when that's not in the political mainstream or not discussed in the political mainstream.

He proposes a series of spending programs that are really guided by the Keynesian philosophy. And Barry Goldwater is tremendously controversial, part for his votes against civil rights, which Friedman really supports, part because he's a hardcore libertarian in an age when that's not in the political mainstream or not discussed in the political mainstream.

And I mean, he's just tremendously unpopular, particularly in all the educated precincts where Friedman lives. So Friedman is like... an outcast and a pariah for his support of Goldwater. And so that actually really affects monetarism because people feel that this is now becoming a package deal.