Jennifer Burns

we don't want these dollars, we'd like some gold instead. And they have the right to go to the treasury, send in an order and get gold out. And so they start doing this more and more and it becomes, it's called the gold drain and the United States starts running out of gold. They're aware this is happening through the 60s, they're trying various things to fix it. And when Nixon comes into office,

we don't want these dollars, we'd like some gold instead. And they have the right to go to the treasury, send in an order and get gold out. And so they start doing this more and more and it becomes, it's called the gold drain and the United States starts running out of gold. They're aware this is happening through the 60s, they're trying various things to fix it. And when Nixon comes into office,

we don't want these dollars, we'd like some gold instead. And they have the right to go to the treasury, send in an order and get gold out. And so they start doing this more and more and it becomes, it's called the gold drain and the United States starts running out of gold. They're aware this is happening through the 60s, they're trying various things to fix it. And when Nixon comes into office,

In 68, Friedman sends him a memo and it says, This is going to be a real problem. He says something like, this is a running sore and you have to lance it right away. Some very graphic metaphor. Otherwise, it's going to explode. And Nixon just files the memo away. Nixon loved people to think he was influenced by and following the wisdom of Milton Friedman, but he didn't actually want to do that.

In 68, Friedman sends him a memo and it says, This is going to be a real problem. He says something like, this is a running sore and you have to lance it right away. Some very graphic metaphor. Otherwise, it's going to explode. And Nixon just files the memo away. Nixon loved people to think he was influenced by and following the wisdom of Milton Friedman, but he didn't actually want to do that.

In 68, Friedman sends him a memo and it says, This is going to be a real problem. He says something like, this is a running sore and you have to lance it right away. Some very graphic metaphor. Otherwise, it's going to explode. And Nixon just files the memo away. Nixon loved people to think he was influenced by and following the wisdom of Milton Friedman, but he didn't actually want to do that.

He just wanted a political benefit that came from it. Then comes the moment where the U.S. Treasury Department realizes we're going to run out of gold. What should we do? And everybody decamps to Camp David. And Nixon decides we're just going to stop redeeming currency for gold. It's called slamming the gold window shut. Done.

He just wanted a political benefit that came from it. Then comes the moment where the U.S. Treasury Department realizes we're going to run out of gold. What should we do? And everybody decamps to Camp David. And Nixon decides we're just going to stop redeeming currency for gold. It's called slamming the gold window shut. Done.

He just wanted a political benefit that came from it. Then comes the moment where the U.S. Treasury Department realizes we're going to run out of gold. What should we do? And everybody decamps to Camp David. And Nixon decides we're just going to stop redeeming currency for gold. It's called slamming the gold window shut. Done.

And he also, at that same meeting, decides to institute price controls and He does a whole bunch of stuff. It's an emergency. He calls it the new economic plan, which is an unconscious echo of the Soviet new economic plan. So a problematic name, a problematic policy. And Friedman is livid at the price controls, but he's like, actually, it's great that you closed the gold window.

And he also, at that same meeting, decides to institute price controls and He does a whole bunch of stuff. It's an emergency. He calls it the new economic plan, which is an unconscious echo of the Soviet new economic plan. So a problematic name, a problematic policy. And Friedman is livid at the price controls, but he's like, actually, it's great that you closed the gold window.

And he also, at that same meeting, decides to institute price controls and He does a whole bunch of stuff. It's an emergency. He calls it the new economic plan, which is an unconscious echo of the Soviet new economic plan. So a problematic name, a problematic policy. And Friedman is livid at the price controls, but he's like, actually, it's great that you closed the gold window.

Let's go all the way to floating exchange rates. And this idea was heresy within the Treasury Department. Everyone's very... committed to the idea of the gold standard, convertibility, possibility, the United States at the core of the financial system, kind of hem and haw. But at this point, Friedman has a very close relationship with George Shultz.

Let's go all the way to floating exchange rates. And this idea was heresy within the Treasury Department. Everyone's very... committed to the idea of the gold standard, convertibility, possibility, the United States at the core of the financial system, kind of hem and haw. But at this point, Friedman has a very close relationship with George Shultz.

Let's go all the way to floating exchange rates. And this idea was heresy within the Treasury Department. Everyone's very... committed to the idea of the gold standard, convertibility, possibility, the United States at the core of the financial system, kind of hem and haw. But at this point, Friedman has a very close relationship with George Shultz.

And George Shultz is a high-level appointee who will eventually, over the course of the Nixon administration, become the Treasury Secretary. And so... Friedman is feeding Schultz all his ideas about how we should move to floating exchange rates, how we shouldn't try to reconstruct Bretton Woods. And the people in Treasury...

And George Shultz is a high-level appointee who will eventually, over the course of the Nixon administration, become the Treasury Secretary. And so... Friedman is feeding Schultz all his ideas about how we should move to floating exchange rates, how we shouldn't try to reconstruct Bretton Woods. And the people in Treasury...

And George Shultz is a high-level appointee who will eventually, over the course of the Nixon administration, become the Treasury Secretary. And so... Friedman is feeding Schultz all his ideas about how we should move to floating exchange rates, how we shouldn't try to reconstruct Bretton Woods. And the people in Treasury...

It's funny because I've read some of their accounts, and actually Paul Volcker is in the Treasury Department at this time, and he can kind of sense that Friedman is in here somewhere, you know, like feeding his boss ideas. He doesn't quite know. And, you know, in oral history, Schultz talks about this quite a bit.

It's funny because I've read some of their accounts, and actually Paul Volcker is in the Treasury Department at this time, and he can kind of sense that Friedman is in here somewhere, you know, like feeding his boss ideas. He doesn't quite know. And, you know, in oral history, Schultz talks about this quite a bit.