Jennifer Burns

It's funny because I've read some of their accounts, and actually Paul Volcker is in the Treasury Department at this time, and he can kind of sense that Friedman is in here somewhere, you know, like feeding his boss ideas. He doesn't quite know. And, you know, in oral history, Schultz talks about this quite a bit.

So at any rate, Friedman exerts this behind-the-scenes influence, and what Schultz does is just kind of – lets Bretton Woods fade away. He doesn't make grand pronouncements. It just slowly, the world shifts to a regime of... For a while, it was like a regime of steady prices, and then they call it a steady regime of changing prices or whatever.

So at any rate, Friedman exerts this behind-the-scenes influence, and what Schultz does is just kind of – lets Bretton Woods fade away. He doesn't make grand pronouncements. It just slowly, the world shifts to a regime of... For a while, it was like a regime of steady prices, and then they call it a steady regime of changing prices or whatever.

So at any rate, Friedman exerts this behind-the-scenes influence, and what Schultz does is just kind of – lets Bretton Woods fade away. He doesn't make grand pronouncements. It just slowly, the world shifts to a regime of... For a while, it was like a regime of steady prices, and then they call it a steady regime of changing prices or whatever.

The language changes, the reality changes, and they kind of end up where they are. So That's a real measure of Friedman's influence. If there had been another economist in Schultz's ear that said, no, catastrophe is imminent. We have to go back to Bretton Woods. He probably would have worked harder. The US government would have worked harder.

The language changes, the reality changes, and they kind of end up where they are. So That's a real measure of Friedman's influence. If there had been another economist in Schultz's ear that said, no, catastrophe is imminent. We have to go back to Bretton Woods. He probably would have worked harder. The US government would have worked harder.

The language changes, the reality changes, and they kind of end up where they are. So That's a real measure of Friedman's influence. If there had been another economist in Schultz's ear that said, no, catastrophe is imminent. We have to go back to Bretton Woods. He probably would have worked harder. The US government would have worked harder.

And so that becomes one of these pieces of globalization. And what people don't realize is there used to be, in addition to these floating set capital ratios, you couldn't bring capital in and out of different countries. You had to register. You couldn't invest. where all these rules and strictures and the falling of Bretton Woods really blows that all open. It's a precursor to globalization.

And so that becomes one of these pieces of globalization. And what people don't realize is there used to be, in addition to these floating set capital ratios, you couldn't bring capital in and out of different countries. You had to register. You couldn't invest. where all these rules and strictures and the falling of Bretton Woods really blows that all open. It's a precursor to globalization.

And so that becomes one of these pieces of globalization. And what people don't realize is there used to be, in addition to these floating set capital ratios, you couldn't bring capital in and out of different countries. You had to register. You couldn't invest. where all these rules and strictures and the falling of Bretton Woods really blows that all open. It's a precursor to globalization.

So Friedman is right there. Now, he's very ambivalent about Nixon. I mean, he sees that Nixon is not an honest person. He thinks he's very intelligent. And Nixon's dream is to create a new centrist majority. So he does many things to go back on his principles. supposed economic principles and ideals. So Friedman does not like this. He doesn't like the price controls.

So Friedman is right there. Now, he's very ambivalent about Nixon. I mean, he sees that Nixon is not an honest person. He thinks he's very intelligent. And Nixon's dream is to create a new centrist majority. So he does many things to go back on his principles. supposed economic principles and ideals. So Friedman does not like this. He doesn't like the price controls.

So Friedman is right there. Now, he's very ambivalent about Nixon. I mean, he sees that Nixon is not an honest person. He thinks he's very intelligent. And Nixon's dream is to create a new centrist majority. So he does many things to go back on his principles. supposed economic principles and ideals. So Friedman does not like this. He doesn't like the price controls.

He's in communication with his old mentor, Arthur Burns, who's now the chair of the Federal Reserve. And Burns is basically doing everything wrong in monetary policy. And I describe this in the book in some detail, these anguished letters back and forth. And basically, as I see it, Burns doesn't have a solid theory of inflation.

He's in communication with his old mentor, Arthur Burns, who's now the chair of the Federal Reserve. And Burns is basically doing everything wrong in monetary policy. And I describe this in the book in some detail, these anguished letters back and forth. And basically, as I see it, Burns doesn't have a solid theory of inflation.

He's in communication with his old mentor, Arthur Burns, who's now the chair of the Federal Reserve. And Burns is basically doing everything wrong in monetary policy. And I describe this in the book in some detail, these anguished letters back and forth. And basically, as I see it, Burns doesn't have a solid theory of inflation.

And the more Friedman pushes him, it's almost like Burns is willfully ignoring Friedman and kind of doing the opposite of what Friedman says. So Burns is running a very loose monetary policy. Inflation is quite considerable over the 70s. I mean, we were all spooked by what did it get to 6%, something like that, recently for a very short time.

And the more Friedman pushes him, it's almost like Burns is willfully ignoring Friedman and kind of doing the opposite of what Friedman says. So Burns is running a very loose monetary policy. Inflation is quite considerable over the 70s. I mean, we were all spooked by what did it get to 6%, something like that, recently for a very short time.

And the more Friedman pushes him, it's almost like Burns is willfully ignoring Friedman and kind of doing the opposite of what Friedman says. So Burns is running a very loose monetary policy. Inflation is quite considerable over the 70s. I mean, we were all spooked by what did it get to 6%, something like that, recently for a very short time.

This is inflation going over 10%, hovering an 8% for basically the whole decade of the 70s, going up and down with extremely elevated rates. And so... The Carter presidency largely falls. Foreign policy is a big part of it, but the failure to tame inflation is part of it. And then Reagan comes in. And now Reagan loves Friedman and Friedman loves Reagan. Very mutual feeling.