Joachim Bitterlich

It was our traditional week of budget debate in German Parliament and Kohl prepared himself over the weekend the famous ten points.

We had been in a small team.

We were noting for the Chancellor point by point what were the most important steps towards it and we had even in this small team a certain debate about reunification.

Parts of the team were skeptical about.

The famous day in Strasbourg, which has been, for Cole, one of the most difficult European councils he has ever been heading, where Margaret Thatcher was, let's say, the opposition to German unification, supported by the Dutch Prime Minister, Wood Lovers, and supported by the Italian Prime Minister of that time, Giulio Anderotti.

But the rest of the Europeans were saying, OK, go on.

We needed George Bush, senior, to overcome Margaret Thatcher's resistance.

And it was George Bush phoning to Margaret Thatcher on the eve of the 12th of September to ask her, please give up now.

We agree.

And then Britain has given up.

Only then.

And this was the moment where...

Well, the British have been, let's call it, invited by the Americans to give up.

Well, I call this the special relationship between Britain and the US, and at the same time I call this realism.

Because if the most important ally is contradicting you in a decisive question, this means you could lose this ally, and therefore, well, it is given up.

I don't see any other politician of that period who would have had this courage and this long-term view of history.

No one expected it, no one.

Eastern Germany, well, it's not there where we'd like to see it.

On the other hand, if you go there, Dresden has been rebuilt, the centre, and they say it's marvellous.

The same applies to Leipzig, to other eastern German cities.