Joe Carlsmith

Suppose it is true.

I think that's fairly explicable in moral anti-realist terms.

You can say roughly that like, yeah, you and Aristotle are sufficiently similar and you endorse sufficiently similar kind of reflective processes.

And those processes are in fact instantiated in the march of history that yeah, you know, history has been good for both of you.

And I don't think that's, you know, I think there are,

where that isn't the case.

And so I think there's a sense in which maybe that prediction is more likely for realism than anti-realism, but it doesn't move me very much.

On this question of kind of do the worlds where there's not this kind of convergent,

moral force, whether kind of metaphysically inflationary or not, matter, or are those the only worlds that matter?

It's like, yeah, maybe the, or the worlds without that, the worlds where there's no DAO.

Let's use the term DAO for like this kind of convergent morality.

Okay, well, let's distinguish between ways you can be doomed.

One way is kind of philosophical.

So you could be the sort of moral realist, you know, or kind of realist-ish person, of which there are many, who have the following intuition.

They're like, if not moral realism, then nothing matters.

right?

It's dust and ashes.

It is my metaphysics and, and, or like normative view or the void.

Right.

Um, and I think this is, uh, a common, a common view.