Joe Carlsmith

Like, I guess I'm kind of like which, which view like predicts this hard.

I guess it feels to me like moral anti-realism is like very comfortable with the, um, observation of the, like people with certain values have those values.

Well, yeah.

So there's obviously this like first thing, which is like any, if you're the culmination of some process of moral change, then it's very easy to look back at that process and be like moral progress.

Like the arc of history bends towards me.

Um,

you can look more like if it was like, if there was a bunch of dice rolls around the, along the way, you might be like, Oh wait, that's not ration.

That's not the march of reason.

Um, that's so there's, there's still like empirical work you can do to tell whether that's what's going on.

Um, but I also think it's just, you know, on moral anti-realism, I think it's just still possible to say like, consider Aristotle and us.

Right.

And we're like, okay, has there been moral progress by Aristotle's lights?

Um,

or something, and our lights too, right?

And you could think, ah, isn't that a little bit like moral realism?

It's like these hearts are singing in harmony.

That's the moral realist thing, right?

The anti-realist thing, the hearts all go different directions, but you and Aristotle apparently like are both excited about the kind of march of history.

Some open question about whether that's true.

Like what are Aristotle's like reflective values, right?