Jonathan Birch

No. And in the book, I have these two concepts, sentience candidate and investigation priority, where that second group of investigation priority is for those cases where the evidence is falling short of sentience candidature. But we think there's a

No. And in the book, I have these two concepts, sentience candidate and investigation priority, where that second group of investigation priority is for those cases where the evidence is falling short of sentience candidature. But we think there's a

prospect of that bar being achieved by future evidence and we think there are welfare risks posed by human activity that might call for precautions and so some invertebrates are put in that category but unicellular organisms and plants i don't think are investigation priorities either.

prospect of that bar being achieved by future evidence and we think there are welfare risks posed by human activity that might call for precautions and so some invertebrates are put in that category but unicellular organisms and plants i don't think are investigation priorities either.

Yeah, there's just no evidence of the relevant kinds at all, I would say, in plants. you have this quite wide range of realistic possibilities about the brain mechanisms supporting sentience, some of them emphasizing the cortex, prefrontal cortex, other ones emphasizing the midbrain.

Yeah, there's just no evidence of the relevant kinds at all, I would say, in plants. you have this quite wide range of realistic possibilities about the brain mechanisms supporting sentience, some of them emphasizing the cortex, prefrontal cortex, other ones emphasizing the midbrain.

These are all credible theories, and on none of those theories are any of the relevant mechanisms present in plants as far as we know. So I guess I don't want to say that people can't speculate. because it's all right.

These are all credible theories, and on none of those theories are any of the relevant mechanisms present in plants as far as we know. So I guess I don't want to say that people can't speculate. because it's all right.

And I don't want to say people can't research the question if they want to, but I think it would be a mistake to say that there is evidence now, which is very different from a lot of invertebrates.

And I don't want to say people can't research the question if they want to, but I think it would be a mistake to say that there is evidence now, which is very different from a lot of invertebrates.

Well, in the book, I'm trying to speak to everyone in the range of reasonable disagreement. And I suggest that physicalism is not the only reasonable view and that there are sensibly articulated versions of dualism, panpsychism, panprotopsychism. Often, in the modern versions of those views,

Well, in the book, I'm trying to speak to everyone in the range of reasonable disagreement. And I suggest that physicalism is not the only reasonable view and that there are sensibly articulated versions of dualism, panpsychism, panprotopsychism. Often, in the modern versions of those views,

like the Philip Goff version of panpsychism, the so-called Rossellian monism, the questions we end up asking about animals end up surprisingly similar. It's just that where other people say sentient or conscious, the Rossellian monist ends up saying macro-conscious because for them, electrons are not sentient beings as such and that they don't have pain, pleasure, and so on.

like the Philip Goff version of panpsychism, the so-called Rossellian monism, the questions we end up asking about animals end up surprisingly similar. It's just that where other people say sentient or conscious, the Rossellian monist ends up saying macro-conscious because for them, electrons are not sentient beings as such and that they don't have pain, pleasure, and so on.

They don't have rich inner lives. And so they still face this question of under what conditions do those tiny micro-conscious states combine to form a unified macro-conscious subject? And then they're asking exactly the same questions anybody else is. So I think it's a reasonable view in a way, but it doesn't make a huge difference to practical debates about... sentience.

They don't have rich inner lives. And so they still face this question of under what conditions do those tiny micro-conscious states combine to form a unified macro-conscious subject? And then they're asking exactly the same questions anybody else is. So I think it's a reasonable view in a way, but it doesn't make a huge difference to practical debates about... sentience.

Yeah, in terms of my personal views, I try to keep an open mind about these things. I think I've drifted, I suppose, from being relatively convinced materialistic as to being less convinced, I think, okay. Give those those alternatives some chance of being correct, 10% chance.

Yeah, in terms of my personal views, I try to keep an open mind about these things. I think I've drifted, I suppose, from being relatively convinced materialistic as to being less convinced, I think, okay. Give those those alternatives some chance of being correct, 10% chance.

Yeah, yeah. Perhaps, I don't know if that's surprising or not, but those seminar room issues about the mind-body relationship, though intrinsically very interesting, don't make a massive difference when the question is, well, should we drop crabs into pans of boiling water?

Yeah, yeah. Perhaps, I don't know if that's surprising or not, but those seminar room issues about the mind-body relationship, though intrinsically very interesting, don't make a massive difference when the question is, well, should we drop crabs into pans of boiling water?