Jonathan Birch

Well, in some senses of the word conscious, yes. That's right, yeah. If you're the kind of person who wants to use this term conscious to refer to that whole package, the sentience, sapience, and selfhood, then yes, there's going to be lots of animals that are sentient without being conscious.

Well, in some senses of the word conscious, yes. That's right, yeah. If you're the kind of person who wants to use this term conscious to refer to that whole package, the sentience, sapience, and selfhood, then yes, there's going to be lots of animals that are sentient without being conscious.

Now, I don't necessarily think we should use the term in that way, but one of the things I like about sentience is that it very strongly draws people towards that. that most basic aspect, just the raw subjective experience.

Now, I don't necessarily think we should use the term in that way, but one of the things I like about sentience is that it very strongly draws people towards that. that most basic aspect, just the raw subjective experience.

Somewhat. Yeah. Which is not to say that it's perfectly defined. You know, there are real limits on our ability to define subjective experience, but, um,

Somewhat. Yeah. Which is not to say that it's perfectly defined. You know, there are real limits on our ability to define subjective experience, but, um,

The problem with consciousness as a term is that even when you bracket that issue of subjective experience and its mysteriousness, it's still a term people use to refer to many other things as well, like reflection and self-awareness and those other things.

The problem with consciousness as a term is that even when you bracket that issue of subjective experience and its mysteriousness, it's still a term people use to refer to many other things as well, like reflection and self-awareness and those other things.

So I'd rather use a term that is perhaps a little bit more constrained in how you can use it and where people will let you stipulate a bit more. And if I say I just mean the capacity for valence to experience, I think people get that. And they get the need to have a concept that is drawing our attention to states like pain and pleasure, but is a bit broader than that.

So I'd rather use a term that is perhaps a little bit more constrained in how you can use it and where people will let you stipulate a bit more. And if I say I just mean the capacity for valence to experience, I think people get that. And they get the need to have a concept that is drawing our attention to states like pain and pleasure, but is a bit broader than that.

And that is not just about pain and pleasure, but about that whole category of. feelings, experiences that feel bad or feel good.

And that is not just about pain and pleasure, but about that whole category of. feelings, experiences that feel bad or feel good.

Well, Jeremy Bentham famously had this footnote where he wrote in relation to other animals, the question is not can they talk nor can they reason, but can they suffer? And I think that's a

Well, Jeremy Bentham famously had this footnote where he wrote in relation to other animals, the question is not can they talk nor can they reason, but can they suffer? And I think that's a

to me at least, a profound insight that if an animal can't speak to us and tell us how it's feeling, if it can't reason very well, as arguably is the situation with a shrimp, for example, it doesn't mean that it's feeling nothing. It doesn't mean that it's incapable of suffering. So it doesn't mean that there aren't things we could do to it that would be cruel and that would cross ethical lines.

to me at least, a profound insight that if an animal can't speak to us and tell us how it's feeling, if it can't reason very well, as arguably is the situation with a shrimp, for example, it doesn't mean that it's feeling nothing. It doesn't mean that it's incapable of suffering. So it doesn't mean that there aren't things we could do to it that would be cruel and that would cross ethical lines.

Yeah, I think we're already asking the questions and I think it's right to be asking the questions and it's right to try and run ahead as it were to for the ethical debates to be running ahead of where the technology actually is, because we might get quite rapidly overtaken by events in the AI case. Right.

Yeah, I think we're already asking the questions and I think it's right to be asking the questions and it's right to try and run ahead as it were to for the ethical debates to be running ahead of where the technology actually is, because we might get quite rapidly overtaken by events in the AI case. Right.

When I think about aspects of human consciousness that might possibly be uniquely human, I think that inner monologue is one of them. It's not something even all humans have. And you get a lot of reports of variation among humans where some people say, what is this inner monologue? I've never experienced anything like that. And other people, including myself, for whom it's there constantly.

When I think about aspects of human consciousness that might possibly be uniquely human, I think that inner monologue is one of them. It's not something even all humans have. And you get a lot of reports of variation among humans where some people say, what is this inner monologue? I've never experienced anything like that. And other people, including myself, for whom it's there constantly.